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Case: CR-2012-0012437-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan

Defendant: Brooks, Matthew 0
State of Idaho vs. Matthew 0 Brooks

Felony
)ate
5/14/2012

;/15/2012

Judge
New Case Filed-Felony

Daya 0 Onanubosi

Affidavit Of Probable Cause

Dayo 0 Onanubosi

Criminal Complaint

Daya 0 Onanubosi

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment (In Custody) 05/14/2012 01 :32 PM)

Daya 0 Onanubosi

Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 05/14/2012
01 :32 PM: Hearing Held

Dayo 0 Onanubosi

Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 05/14/2012
01 :32 PM: Arraignment I First Appearance

Daya 0 Onanubosi

Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 05/14/2012
01 :32 PM: Constitutional Rights Warning

Daya 0 Onanubosi

Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 05/14/2012
01 :32 PM: Order Appointing Public Defender

Daya 0 Onanubosi

Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 05/14/2012
01:32 PM: Consolidation Of Files w/CR2012-12215*C

Dayo 0 Onanubosi

Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 05/14/2012
01 :32 PM: Commitment On Bond/$25,000.00

Dayo 0 Onanubosi

Change Assigned Judge

Gregor; F. Frates

Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Hearing 05/24/2012 08:30 AM)

Gregory F. Frates

Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 25000.00 )

Gregory F. Frates

Notice of Bond Posted

Gregory F. Frates

PA's Response For Request For Discovery

Gregory F. Frates

Request For Discovery

Gregory F. Frates

Demand For Notice Of Defense Of Alibi

Gregory F. Frates

/16/2012

Waiver Of Extradition

Gregory F. Frates

/24/2012

Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing scheduled on 05/24/2012 08:30 AM: Charles Hay
Hearing Held
Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing scheduled on 05/24/2012 08:30 AM: Charles Hay
Preliminary Hearing Waived (bound Over)
Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing scheduled on 05/24/2012 08:30 AM: Charles Hay
Order Binding Defendant Over to District Court

/1/2012

Hearing Scheduled (Arrn. - District Court 06/01/2012 09:00 AM)

Molly J Huskey

Information

Thomas J Ryan

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Laura Whiting
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages

Gregory M Culet

Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 06/01/2012 09:03 AM: Gregory M Culet
Hearing Held RYAN-PT-AUG 27@1 :30-RYAN-JT-SEPT
25-27@9:00-MORFITT
Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 06/01/2012 09:03 AM: Gregory M Culet
Arraignment I First Appearance RYAN-PT-AUG 27@1 :30-RYAN-JT-SEPT
25-27@9:00-MORFITT

icia! District Court - Canyon County

Date: 6/27/2013
Time: 09:20 AM
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User: WALDEMER

ROA Report
Case: CR-2012-0012437-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan
Defendant: Brooks, Matthew 0

State of Idaho vs. Matthew 0 Brooks

Felony
Judge

Jate
3/1/2012

Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 06/01/2012 09:03 AM: Gregory M Culet
Appear & Plead Not Guilty RYAN-PT-AUG 27@1:30-RYAN-JT-SEPT
25-27@9:00-MORFITT
Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 08/27/2012 01 :30 PM)

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/25/2012 09:00 AM)

James C. Morfitt

Notice Of Hearing

Court Clerks District (998)

3/5/2012

Request For Discovery

Thomas J Ryan

3/29/2012

Motion to Suppress

Thomas J Ryan

Memorandum of Law In Support of Motion To Suppress

Thomas J Ryan

Notice Of Hearing

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 07/23/2012 02:00 PM) Motion to
Suppress

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 07/23/2012 02:00 PM:
Continued Motion to Suppress

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 07/23/2012 02:00 PM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 08/16/2012 01:30 PM) to suppress

Thomas J Ryan

;1212012

Pa's First Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery

Thomas J Ryan

;/9/2012

Pa's Second Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery

Thomas J Ryan

i/14/2012

Objection To Motion To Suppress Evidence

Thomas J Ryan

i/15/2012

papers/Notice and Demand For Abatement

Thomas J Ryan

;/16/2012

Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 08/27/2012 01 :30 PM: Hearing
Vacated

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/16/2012 01 :30 PM:
Hearing Held to suppress - 14 days for additional briefing

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/16/2012 01 :30 PM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 09/18/2012 01 :30 PM)

Thomas J Ryan

/24/2012

Pa's Third Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery

Thomas J Ryan

/29/2012

Defendant's Supplemental Brief In Support Of Motion To Suppress

Thomas J Ryan

/30/2012

Motion To Appear Tele phonically At Pre-Trial Conference

Thomas J Ryan

7

/23/2012

Order allowing def to appear telephonically at PT conference

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 09/18/2012 01 :30 PM: Hearing
Vacated

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 09/18/2012 03:00 PM) Def to appear
Telephonically

Thomas J Ryan

/4/2012

Objection to motion to suppress evidence

Thomas J Ryan

110/2012

Order to Provide Auto Recording without Cost

Thomas J Ryan

/31/2012

Jate: 6/27 /2013
fime: 09:20 AM
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ROA Report
Case: CR-2012-0012437-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan
Defendant: Brooks, Matthew 0

State of Idaho vs. Matthew 0 Brooks

Felony
)ate

Judge

j/17/2012

Response to State's Objection to Motion to Suppress

Thomas J Ryan

3/18/2012

Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 09/18/2012 03:00 PM: Hearing
Held Def to appear Telephonically

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 09/18/2012 03:00 PM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100

Thomas J Ryan

l/19/2012

Memorandum decision upon motion to suppress

Thomas J Ryan

l/21/2012

Pa's Fourth Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery

Thomas J Ryan

Motion To Shorten Time For Hearing And Notice Of Hearing

Thomas J Ryan

Motion To Continue JT And Notice Of Hearing

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 09/24/2012 09:00 AM) motion to
shorten time, motion to continue

James C. Morfitt

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 09/24/2012 09:00 AM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Carole Bull
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages motion to shorten time, motion to continue

James C. Morfitt

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 09/24/2012 09:00 AM:
Hearing Held motion to shorten time, motion to continue

James C. Morfitt

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 09/24/2012 09:00 AM:
Continued motion to shorten time, motion to continue

James C. Morfitt

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 09/25/2012 09:00 AM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Debora Kreidler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages State's Mo to Shorten Time I to Continue

James C. Morfitt

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 09/25/2012 09:00 AM: Failure
To Appear For Hearing Or Trial State's Mo to Shorten Time I to Continue

James C. Morfitt

l/24/2012

l/25/2012

/27/2012

0/10/2012

Notice of Bond Forfeiture

James C. Morfitt

Warrant Issued - Bench Bond amount: 50000.00
Failure to Appear-total
bond with CR-2012-12215*C Defendant: Brooks, Matthew 0

Thomas J Ryan

Case Status Changed: Inactive

Thomas J Ryan

Motion to reconside order denying motion to suppress

Thomas J Ryan

Motion for permission to appeal

Thomas J Ryan

Case Status Changed: Reopened

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 10/10/2012 10:30 AM) Motn for
Permission to Appeal/ Motn to Reconsider

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 10/10/2012 10:30 AM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 10/10/2012 10:30 AM:
Hearing Held Motn for Permission to Appeal/ Motn to Reconsider

Thomas J Ryan

'.Jate: 6/27/2013

icial District Court - Canyon County

Time: 09:20 AM
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Case: CR-2012-0012437-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan
Defendant: Brooks, Matthew 0

State of Idaho vs. Matthew 0 Brooks

Felony
)ate
0/10/2012

Judge
Thomas J Ryan

Motion Held - Motn to Reconsider
motion to reconsider taken under advisement-court to issue written ruling

Thomas J Ryan

Objection to Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to
Supress & Leave for Motion to Appeal

Thomas J Ryan

I 0/16/2012

Order Denying Motion to Reconsider

Thomas J Ryan

:1/19/2012

Order Denying Motion For Permission to Appeal

Thomas J Ryan

U11/2013

Warrant Returned Failure to Appear-total bond with CR-2012-12215*C
Defendant: Brooks, Matthew Of served in Hillsboro Oregon

Thomas J Ryan

Inactive

Thomas J Ryan

Case Status Changed: Inactive

Thomas J Ryan

status changed to Active

Thomas J Ryan

Case Status Changed: Pending

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment (In Custody) 02/21/2013 01 :30 PM)

James A (J.R.) Schiller

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment (In Custody) 02/21/2013 01 :30 PM)

James A (J.R.) Schiller

Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 02/21/2013
01 :30 PM: Hearing Held

James A (J.R.) Schiller

Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 02/21/2013
01 :30 PM: Arraignment I First Appearance

James A (J.R.) Schiller

Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 02/21/2013
01 :30 PM: Order Appointing Public Defender

James A (J.R.) Schiller

Hearing Scheduled (Arrn. - District Court 03/01/2013 09:00 AM)

Molly J Huskey

'./21/2013

/1/2013

Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 03/01/2013 09:07 AM: Dennis E. Goff
Hearing Held RYAN-FTA-JURY TRIAL
JT-MARCH 508@8:30-MORFITT
JT-APRIL 23-26@8:30-MORFITT
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/23/2013 08:30 AM)

James C. Morfitt

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Laura Whiting
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100

Dennis E. Goff

Notice Of Hearing

Dennis E. Goff

/4/2013

PD-Request For Discovery

Thomas J Ryan

/12/2013

Motion To Set Aside Forfeiture And Exonerate Bond And Conditional
Request For Hearing (w/order)

Thomas J Ryan

/13/2013

Notice Of Hearing For Change Of Plea

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing Scheduled (Change of Plea 03/15/2013 12:30 AM)

Renae J. Hoff

/15/2013

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 04/23/2013 08:30 AM:
Vacated

Hearing James C. Morfitt

Renae J. Hoff
Hearing result for Change of Plea scheduled on 03/15/2013 01 :30 PM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kathy Klemetson
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Jess than 100 pages
SENT- May 6@2:15PM
PCS {F}

icial District Court - Canyon County

Jate: 6/27/2013

Time: 09:20 AM
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ROA Report
Case: CR-2012-0012437-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan

Defendant: Brooks, Matthew 0
State of Idaho vs. Matthew 0 Brooks

Felony
Judge

Jate
3/15/2013

Hearing result for Change of Plea scheduled on 03/15/2013 01 :30 PM:
Hearing Held RYANSENT- May 6@2:15PM
PCS {F}

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Change of Plea scheduled on 03/15/2013 01 :30 PM:
Guilty Plea Advisory Form RYANSENT- May 6@2:15PM
PCS {F}

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Change of Plea scheduled on 03/15/2013 01 :30 PM:
Change Plea To Guilty Before Hit RYANSENT- May 6@2:15PM
PCS {F}

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Change of Plea scheduled on 03/15/2013 01 :30 PM:
Order for Pre-Sentence Investigation Report and Substance Abuse
Assessment RYANSENT- May 6@2:15PM
PCS {F}

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Change of Plea scheduled on 03/15/2013 01 :30 PM:
Order to Report to District Ill Probation and Parole

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Change of Plea scheduled on 03/15/2013 01 :30 PM:
Renae J. Hoff
Order Release to Pre-trial Release Program-to be released at 8:00 a.m. on
3/18/13

)/6/2013

Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 05/06/2013 02: 15 PM) PSI/SA

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 05/06/2013 02:15 PM:
Continued PSI/SA

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 05/06/2013 02:15 PM: District Thomas J Ryan
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100

)/7/2013

/8/2013

Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 05/07 /2013 01 :30 PM) PSI & SA

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 05/07/2013 01 :30 PM:
Hearing Held PSI & SA

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 05/07 /2013 01 :30 PM:
Withheld Judgment Entered PSI & SA

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 05/07/2013 01 :30 PM:
Sentenced To Fine And Incarceration PSI & SA

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 05/07/2013 01:30 PM:
Probation Ordered PSI & SA

Thomas J Ryan

Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 05/07/2013 01 :30 PM:
to defendant upon sentencing

Notice Thomas J Ryan

Case Status Changed: closed pending clerk action

Thomas J Ryan

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100

Thomas J Ryan

Restitution Order Filed

Thomas J Ryan

Restitution Ordered 100.00 victim# 1

Thomas J Ryan

Thir

Date: 6/27/2013

icial District Court - Canyon County

Time: 09:20 AM
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ROA Report
Case: CR-2012-0012437-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan

Defendant: Brooks, Matthew 0
State of Idaho vs. Matthew 0 Brooks

Felony
Judge

Jate
5/9/2013

Surety Bond Exonerated (Amount 25,000.00)

Thomas J Ryan

5/14/2013

Order of probation on withheld judgment

Thomas J Ryan

)/24/2013

Motion For Appointment Of State Appellate Public Defender

Thomas J Ryan

3/3/2013

Notice of Appeal

Thomas J Ryan

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Thomas J Ryan

Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender

Thomas J Ryan

IN THE COURT OF THE 3rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)

vs.

ISP DR#:B12001578
Citation#: ISP0136310
PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT
)

BROOKS, Matthew 0
Defendant.

t!R

~JCJ737

DOB
SSN:
OLN
STATE: Idaho
State ofldaho,

)
)

County of Canyon

SS.

)

I, Trooper Blake 9igley, the undersigned, being duly sworn of oath, deposes and says that:
1. I am a peace officer employed by the Idaho State Police.
2. The defendant was arrested on May 12, 2012 at 1350 hours DAM I ~PM for the
crime(s) of:

I. Felony Possession ofMethamphetamine- 37-2732C(3)(1)
II. Possession of Drug Paraphemalia-37-2734A
3. Location of Occurrence: Eastbound Interstate 84@approximatelymilepost 27.5,
Canyon County, Idaho
4. Identified the defendant as: DIAZ, Roberto by:
0Driver's License ~Verbal by Defendant
0Military ID
Ostate ID Card
Ocredit Cards
0Paperwork Found
0Witness _ _ identified defendant.

0Student ID Card
Oother: _ _

5. The crime(s) was committed in my presence. ~yes I ONo
If no, information was supplied to me by: (witness)_ _ .
6. I believe there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed such crime(s)
because of the following facts:
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

NOTE: You must include the source of all information that you provided below. Include
both what you observed and what you learned from someone else (include name of that
person).
PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE STOP AND ARREST:
On May 12, 2012 hours, at approximately 1632 hours, I, Trooper Blake Higley, stopped a
blue Ford ThlU1derbird (Washington registration 706XJZ) on eastbound Interstate 84 at
approximately milepost 27.5 in Canyon, County Idaho. I first observed this vehicle as it passed my
location traveling 60 mph in a posted 75mph speed zone. As I approached the location of the
vehicle, I observed it again traveling well below the posted speed limit of 65mph. I observed the
vehicle traveling in the left lane, the vehicle signaled briefly, for less than two seconds and changed
into the right lane. The lane cha,.71ge was abrupt and sudden. I approached the vehicle and spoke
I immediately
with the driver, later identified verbally as Matthew 0 BROOKS (DO
it. Also
saw a pack of cigarettes sitting on the front passenger seat with two cig
contained within cigarette box was a small plastic bag which contained a crystal substance which I
believed to be metharnphetamine. I could also smell the odor of marijuana in the vehicle, and could
plainly see a small metal cone, which I knew to be the top portion of a marijuana pipe sitting in the
center console. I asked BROOKS about meth use, which he denied. BROOKS later admitted to
using methamphetamine two months ago. I reached in the vehicle and retrieved the cigarette box
containing what I believed to be methamphetamine. BROOKS attempted to stop me from
retrieving the box. I placed the cigarette box on the roof of the vehicle, and told BROOKS to exit
the vehicle. I placed BROOKS in handcuffs and instructed him he was being d.etained. BROOKS
was non-compliant and it took several minutes to get his name. \\'bile searching the interior of the
vehicle, a marijuana pipe was found behind the driver's seat. I also located a blue zipper pouch in
the top zipper compartment of the suitcase. Within the pouch, I located two injection needles, a
spoon, rubber band, and baggies. I tested the crystal substance using a Narcotics Identification Kit
(NIK). The test resulted in a presumptive positive for methamphetamine. The total grai.u weight
was .4grams.

Dated: 05113/2012

Subscribed and sworn before me on this~ day of

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (or)

SR'. '12_ Q__Q

2012.. .

9<,.LU1' LCkCD0/

Person Authorized to Administer Oath
Title:

AfA=i

Notary Public ofldaho
Residing

at:'l<_~<i; Toi.a.ho S\-cd:1 ~U fV\t-n'lCcV',
'S/;;> ~ );;..o \ R

My Comrnission Expires:

sz
BRYAN F. TAYLOR
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83 605
Telephone: (208) 454-7391

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
S HILL, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

(_

THE STATE OF IDAHO
CASE NO.CR201
Plaintiff,

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
vs.

POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE
MAT
D.O.B

S

Felony, I.C.37-2732(c)(l)

Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Canyon

)

SS

PERSONALLY APPEARED Before me this

, ---1 ~!'A~ j
~~

)

cf

day of May, 2012,

~of the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, who

being duly sworn, complains and says:

1

COMPLAINT

IG N

the County of Canyon, State ofidaho, did unlawfully possess a controlled substance, to-wit:
Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance.
All of which is contrary to Idaho Code, Section 37-2732(c)(l) and against the
power, peace and dignity of the State of Idaho.

Complainant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this

2
COMPLAINT

'r

day of May, 2012.

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF CANYON
[;J ARRAIGNMENT
[;J IN-CUSTODY
STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CR2012-12437*C/CR2012-12215*C
Plaintiff

-vsMATTHEW 0. BROOKS,

Date: MAY 14, 2012
Defendant.

D True Name
Corrected Name:

Judge: ONANUBOSI
Recording: MAG? (316 - 319)

APPEARANCES:
t8J Defendant
D Defendant's Attorney D

[8J Prosecutor Mr. Matt Thompson
D Interpreter

ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS: Defendant
[;J was informed of the charges against him/her and all legal rights, including the right to be represented by
counsel.
[;J requested court appointed counsel.
D waived right to counsel.
[;J lndigency hearing held.
[;J Court appointed public defender.
D Court denied court-appointed counsel.
D Arraignment continued to
before Judge
D to consult I retain counsel,
D other
[8JPRELIMINARY HEARING:
[8J Preliminary Hearing set
D District Court Arraignment:
BAIL:
D
D
D
D
D

Statutory time waived: DYes [8JNo
May 24, 2012 at 8:30 a.m.

D Preliminary Hearing Waived
before Judge Frates
before Judge

State recommends
Released on written citation promise to appear
Released on own recognizance (O.R.)
Released to pre-trial release officer.
No Contact Order D entered D continued
Address Verified

D Released on bond previously posted.
[8J Remanded to the custody of the sheriff.
[;J Bail set at $25,000.00/total
i:g) Consolidated with CR2012-12215*C
D Corrected Address _ _

OTHER:

ARRAIGNMENT I FIRST APPEARANCE

07/2009

FILED -~~-W-_:_+.1..£::::::::::r.uc -'~-l.--4-•·~·~·
CLERK

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF CANYON

BY~_..,,...:-.++->-~~=-==-"="=-:....;:;-~-

THE STATE OF IDAHO/or

f\~lf~~~ () .~oQ\(J~

ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC

DEFENDER

The Court being fully advised as to the application of the above-named applicant and it appearing to
be a proper case,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Canyon County Public Defender be, and hereby is, appointed for

Dated:

()S \id\\
2
I
,

A~kln
0

Judge

~5,

L\-DH

0
Custody-- Bond$
D00°
1
Released: 0 O.R.
I ·
0 on bond previously posted
0 to PreTrial Release

Juvenile:

0
0

In Custody
Released to

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

0

No Contact Order entered.

0

Cases consolidated.

[Js(,Discovery provided by State.
0

Interpreter required.

0

Additional charge of FTA.

Original--Court File

Yellow--Public Defender

Pink--Prosecuting Attorney

ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC

DEFENDER

2/06

0sh4h~

p.M.

FILED
ATbl1
CLERKL&1lt)-iE. DISTR[CT COURT
BY
~)1Attv-.4)7
, DEPUTY

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OE IDAHO
COUNTY OF CANYON
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

-vs-

Defendant,

u

u

0

Conditional Release/Pretrial Services
Release on Own Recognizance
(71 Commitment on Bond
i.I'-._

0

-~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~)
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the defendant abide by the following conditions of release:

0

Defendant is Ordered released

0

0

On own recognizance

i;iJ. Bond having been set in the sum of $~5(
0

0

0

Placed on probation

Case Dismissed

~~#Total Bond

0

0

Bond having been

0

Upon posting bond, defendant must report to the Canyon County Pretrial Services office as stated below:

0

Defendant shall report to the Canyon County Pretrial Services Office and follow the standard reporting conditions:

increased

reduced to the sum of$

Total Bond

!

0

Comply with a curfew designated by the Court or standard curfew set by Pretrial Services _ _ _ _ _ __

0

Not consume or possess alcoholic beverages or mood altering substances without a valid prescription.

0

Submit to evidentiary testing for alcohol and/or drugs as requested by Pretrial Services at defendant's expense.

0

Not operate or be in the driver's position of any motor vehicle.

0

Abide by any No Contact Order and its conditions.

0

Submit to 0 GPS 0 Alcohol monitoring as directed by Pretrial Services.
Defendants Ordered to submit to GPS or alcohol monitoring shall make arrangements with a provider
approved by Pretrial Services, prior to release.

Failure by defendant to comply with the rules and/or reporting conditions and/or requirements of release as
Ordered by the Court may result in the revocation of release and return to the custody of the Sheriff.

¥White - Court

reJ Yellow- Jail/Pretrial Services

/)

¢Pink - Defendant

10/11

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF CANYON
PRELIMINARY HEARING
STATE OF IDAHO

Case No. CR12-12437C, CR12-12215C
Plaintiff

-vsMatthew 0. Brooks

Date: May 24, 2012
Defendant.

0

Judge: Hay

True Name
Corrected Name:

Recording: Mag 6 {854-854)

APPEARANCES:
[gJ Defendant
[gJ Prosecutor - Will Fletcher

[gJ Defendant's Attorney - Scott James

0

Interpreter

FAILURE TO APPEAR: Defendant failed to appear. It is Ordered
0 bench warrant issued--bail $
0 bond forfeited.
OOther_ _ .
PROCEEDINGS:
[gJ Preliminary hearing waived; Defendant bound over to District Court.
O Preliminary hearing held.
0 Preliminary hearing continued to _ _ at _ _.m. before Judge _ _.
O State moved to dismiss on the grounds: _ _ .
O Court dismissed Complaint.
O Prospective witnesses excluded.
[gJ State's recommendations: Offer not stated but was noted it would remain open until Pre-Trial
Conference.
STATE'S WITNESSES SWORN:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
DEFENDANT'S WITNESSES SWORN:

3.

0

1.
4.

2.
5.

Defendant had no testimony or evidence to present.

EXHIBITS:

0

As set forth on attached list.

COURT'S RULING:
0 No probable cause; Complaint dismissed; Defendant discharged.
0 Bond exonerated.
0 Probable cause found for offense set forth in Complaint.
0 Charges amended to: _ _.
0 Probable cause found for amended charge.
[gJ Defendant held to answer to the District Court. District Court Arraignment set for 6/1/12 at 9:00 a.m.
before Judge Huskey.
(gJ Misdemeanor case(s) continued consolidated with felony case for further proceedings.
D Motion for bond reduction continued until the time of District Court Arraignment.
BAIL:

The Defendant was

-0 Released on own recognizance (O.R.).

n

D

Remanded to custody of the sheriff.
Bail set$ _ _ .

0 Released to pre-trial release officer.
IXl Released on bond previously posted.

OTHER: Mr. James advised the Court of the defendant's intent to hire private counsei.

_k_._B~e~.c~::--_fL-_l_-~_y+--·---· Deputy Clerk
I

PRELIMINARY HEARING

07/2009

Judicial District 0
State of Idaho
1
In and For the Co • ..J f Canyon
1115 Albany Street

Filed:
<,>/'

Clerk of the District Court

Caldwell, Idaho 83605
, Deputy
STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,
vs.

1

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendant,

Preliminary hearing having been

VY\ CJ:tr

,

20 \ '?-

~ved

D

ORDER BINDING DEFENDANT OVER TO
DISTRICT COURT

held

in this case on the

2~~

day of

and the Court being fully satisfied that a public offense has been

committed a:that there is probable or sufficient cause to believe the Defendant guilty thereof,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant herein be held to answer in the District Court of the Third
Judicial District of The State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, to the charge

a felony, committed in Canyon County, Idaho on or about the

20 \ 1---

\

?~

day of

of~OSSeSS~\ 0-Y\ of

l/Y\f<(J

.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant herein shall be arraigned before the District Court of
the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, on the

,j· \A_,0-Q_
20 1 ?_
at C\ -0 0
----~Defendant is continued released on the bond posted.

------'"""--------'

Dated:

\

s+

day of

a.m.

D
D

Defendant's personal recognizance release is

D continued D ordered.

Defendant's release to Pre-Trial Release Officer is

D continued D ordered.

0

YOU, THE SHERIFF OF CANYON COUNTY, IDAHO, are commanded to receive into your
custody and detain the Defendant until legally discharged. Defendant is to be admitted to bail in
the sum of$_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

---"'5;_,_·?r;---·---·_,,__..6'~1=&---

ORDER BINDING DEFENDANT OVER TO DISTRICT

Signed

~

Magistrate

)?:tfe

05i2007

BRYANF. TAYLOR
CANYON COlJNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 454-7391

2 4 2012
C?.NYON COUNTY
CATKINSON,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

THE STATE OF IDAHO
CASE NO. CR2012-12437
!

Plaintiff,

INFORMATION
vs.

MATTHEW 0 BROOKS
D.O.B.

POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE
Felony, I.C.37-2732(c)(l)

Defendant.

BRYAN F. TAYLOR, Prosecuting Attorney in and for the County of Canyon,
State of Idaho, who in the name and by authority of said state prosecutes in its behalf, in proper
person comes into the above entitled Court and informs said Court that the above name
Defendant stands accused by this Information of crime of
POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
Felony
Idaho Code Section 37-2732(c)(l)

INFORMATION

committed as follows:
That the Defendant, Matthew 0 Brooks, on or about the 1

12,

in the County of Canyon, State ofidaho, did unlawfully possess a controlled substance, to-wit:
Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance.
Ali of which is contrary to Idaho Code, Section 37-2732(c)(l) and against the
power, peace and dignity of the State ofidaho.
DATED this

~

day of May, 2012.

-W-IL_L_I_A_M_K_.F_L_E_T_C_H_E_R_fi-or---~
BRYAN F. TAYLOR
Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County, Idaho

INFORMATION

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PRESIDING: GREGORY M. CULET DATE: JUNE 1, 2012

)
)
)

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

COURT MINUTES
CASE NO:

)
)
)

vs.

TIME:

CR-2012-12437*C
CR-2012-12215*C

9:00 AM.

)
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS,

I

)
)

)
Defendant.
~~~~~~~~~)

REPORTED BY: Laura Whiting
DCRT51101-1107

This having been the time heretofore set for District Court Arraignment in the
above entitled matter, the State was represented by Mr. Gearld Wolff, Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County; and the defendant appeared in court and was
represented by counsel, Mr. Randall Grove.
The Court determined the defendant's true name was charged and advised the
defendant that an Information had been filed in case number CR-2012-12437*C
charging him with the felony offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance, which
carried a maximum possible penalty of seven (7) years imprisonment and a $15,000.00
fine.

Further, the Court advised the defendant in case number CR-2012-12215*C, a

uniformed citation had been filed charging him with traffic infractions of Failure to Signal

COURT MINUTES
JUNE 1, 2012

Page I

which carried a penalty of $85.00, Failure to Display Registration, which carried a
penalty of $96.00, Failure to Provide Proof of Liability lnsurance-1 st offense, which
carried a penalty of $126.50; and with the misdemeanor offense of Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, which carried a maximum possible penalty of one (1) year in jail and a
$1,000.00.
The Court addressed counsel regarding procedural issues as to the infraction
matters being consolidated with a felony case.
The Court advised the defendant that the sentences could run concurrent.1
Further, there would be court costs, restitution; and additionally, if he were not a citizen
of the United States and was convicted there could be immigration consequences,
including deportation, denial of residency status and denial of application for United
States citizenship.
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Grove indicated the defendant had reviewed
a copy of the Information and would waive formal reading of the same.
The Court determined the defendant understood the nature of the charges and
the maximum penalties.
ln answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Grove indicated the defendant would enter

a plea of not guilty to all charges and demand speedy trial.

COURT MINUTES
JUNE 1, 2012

Page 2

The Court set the non-infraction charges for a pretrial conference on

August 27, 2012 at 1:30 p.m. before Judge Ryan and a three (3) day jury trial to
commence September 25, 2012 at 9:00 a.m. before Senior Judge Morfitt.
The Court recommended the infraction matters be dealt with separately.
Mr. Grove expressed opinions.
The Court noted the matters would remain consolidated

this time and the

assigned Court could subsequently address the issue.
The Court instructed the defendant to stay in contact with his attorney.
The defendant was continued released on the bond previously posted.

Deputy Clerk

COURT MINUTES
JUNE 1, 2012

Page 3

MARK J. Mll\!IURA
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
LARY G. SISSON
510 Arthur Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 639-4610
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611
Idaho State Bar No. 6072

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF CANYON

STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CR-2012-12437-C
CR-2012-12215-C

Plaintiff,

.MOTION TO SUPPRESS

vs.
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendant, by and through his attorney of record, the Canyon
County Public Defender's Office, and hereby moves this Honorable Coun for an order
suppressing all physical evidence, testimony, lab reports, photos, documents, any other
type of evidence, and statements made by the defendant which were obtained by the State
as a result of an unlawful seizure and search of the defendant and the defendant's vehicle.
In support of this Motion Defendant states the following facts, makes the
following allegations, and requests the following potential evidence be suppressed.

ST ATElVIENT OF RELEV Al'lT FACTS

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

On May 12, 2012, at approximately 4:30 p.m. Trooper Blake Higley, stopped
a blue Ford Thunderbird eastbound Interstate 84 in Canyon, County Idaho. The
driver of the vehicle later identified himself as Matthew 0. Brooks (DOB
Trooper Blakely alleged pulled Mr. Brooks over because he was
traveling well below the speed limit, namely 60 mph in a posted 75mph speed
zone.
However, at that time there was an automobile accident in the right hand lane of
Interstate 84 at that location. Consequently, Mr. Brooks as well as other vehicles were
slowing down because of the accident and moving into the left hand lane.
As Trooper Blakely observed the vehicle traveling in the left lane, Trooper
Blakely believed that the vehicle signaled briefly, for less than two seconds and
changed into the right lane. The lane change was abrupt and sudden. The reason for the
abrupt lane change was that Mr. Brooks had just safe! y cleared th.e accident and needed to
exit the freeway at Exit 28. Mr. Brooks was traveling at approximately 55 miles per hour
just before and as he was changing lanes.
Upon making his initial contact with Mr. Brooks, Trooper Blakely claims to have
seen saw a pack of cigarettes sitting on the front passenger seat with two cigarettes
within it. He also claims the pack of cigarettes contained a small plastic bag which
contained a crystal substance which he believed to be methamphetamine. In his Affidavit
of Probable Cause, Trooper Blakely does not explain how he could see a small plastic
bag within the cigarette pack nor how he knew it contained methamphetamine. Trooper
Blakely also claims that he could also smell the odor of marijuana in the vehicle, and
could plainly see a small metal cone, which he believed to be the top portion of a

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

marijuana pipe sitting in the center console. Trooper Blakeiy asked

Brooks

methamphetamine use, which he denied. Trooper Blakely claims
using methamphetamine two months ago. Trooper Blakely reached

to
the vehicle and

retrieved the cigarette box containing what he believed to be methamphetamine.
Trooper Blakely told Mr. Brooks to exit the vehicle. He placed

Brooks in

handcuffs and instructed him he was being detained. While searching the interior of the
vehicle, Trooper Blakely claims to have found a marijuana pipe behind the diiver's seat.
He also claims to have located a blue zipper pouch in the top zipper compartment of a
suitcase. Within the pouch, he located two injection needles, a spoon, rubber band, and
baggies. Trooper Blakely tested the crystal substance using a Narcotics Identification Kit
(NIK.). The test resulted in a presumptive positive for methamphetamine. According to
Trooper Blakely, the total gram weight was .4grams.
Mr. Brooks is currently charged with felony possession of methamphetamine and
possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to use it.

ALLEGATIONS
Defendant alleges the following:
1.

He was unlawfully seized when Trooper Blakely pulled his vehicle over as
it was exiting Interstate 84.

2.

Because of that unlawful seizure, Trooper Blakely did not have a right to
search Defendant's vehicle and it was thus an iliegal search.

3.

Even if Trooper Blakely's seizure of Defendant was lawful, there was not
enough probable cause to justify a search of Defendant's vehicle without a
valid search warrant.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

. j

4.

Because he was unlawfully seized, and his vehicle unlawfully searched,
any statements made by Mr. Brooks shouid

suppressed because

were obtained unlawfully.
5.

Because he was unlawfully seized, and his vehicle unlawfully searched,
any items that could be considered either illegal or inculpatory should be
suppressed because they were obtained unlawfully.

POTENTIAL EVIDENCE TO BE SUPPRESSED
Defendant has not received discovery materials such as police reports, evidence
lists, audio and/or video recordings, etc.

Nevertheless, Defendant requests that the

following items be suppressed. This includes, but is not necessarily limited to:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

A pack of cigarettes
A small baggy purportedly containing methamphetamine
A small metal cone
A marijuana pipe
A blue zipper pouch A digital scale
Two injection needles
A spoon,
A rnbber band
Baggies
The results of all lab testing

Defendant also requests that any photographs, lab testing results, audio
recordings, video recordings, and statements made by Defendant in connection with these
matters be suppressed.

CONCLUSION
In support of this motion, Defendant will file an affidavit stating why he believes
he was unlawfully seized and searched. Defendant reserves the right to supplement this
Motion with a Brief and other evidence and requests a hearing and oral argument on the
matter.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

4

;r1,__

DATED this

_dJ_ day of June, 2012.
u.,
Assistant Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J0

I hereby certify that on the
(vday of June, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the
with~nd foregoing document upon the individual(s) named below in the manner noted:
G.}13y delivering copies of the same to the courthouse box of the attomey(s) indicated below.
Canyon County Prosecutor's Office
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

Assistant Public Defender

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

(J

.<'[
/)

I l <8<D
CT__./ P.M.

_ _ __,....· .M.

M.ARK J. MIMURA
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

2 9 2012

LARY G. SISSON
510 Arthur St.
Ca;ldwe!L ID 83605
Telephone: (208) 639-4610
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611
Idaho State Bar No. 6072

CANYOf,.! C,()UNTY CLERK

-

~

iHil1
1

At!orneysfor Defendanr
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
STA TE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS,

CASE NO.: CR-2012-12437-C
CR-2012-12215-C

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

Defendant.

TO: THE HONORABLE COURT AND THE CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING
ATTORNEY

COMES NOW Defendant, by and through his attorneys of record, the Canyon
County Public Defender's Office, and hereby provides his Memorandum of Law in
Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On May 12, 2012. at approximately 4:30 p.m. Trooper Blake Higley, stopped
a blue Ford Thunderbird eastbound Interstate 84 in Canyon. County Idaho. The
.\IE.\IOR\:\DF\I OF LAW IN SLPPORT
OF '.\IOTION TO Sl'.PPRESS

driver of the vehicle later identified himself as :V1atthnv 0. Brooks (DOB
Trooper Blakely alleged pulled Mr. B

s over because

was

traveling well below the speed limiL namely 60 mph in a posted 75mph speed
zone.

However, at that time there was an automobile accident in the right hand lane of
Interstate 84 at that location. Consequently, Mr. Brooks as well as other vehicles were
slowing down because of the accident and moving into the left hand lane.

As Trooper Blakely observed the vehicle traveling in the left lane, Trooper
Blakely believed that the vehicle signaled briefly,

less than two seconds and

changed into the right lane. The lane change was abrupt and sudden. The reason for the
abrupt lane change was that Mr. Brooks had just safely cleared the accident and needed to
exit the freeway at Exit 28. Mr. Brooks was traveling at approximately 55 miles per hour
just before and as he \Vas changing lanes.

Upon making his initial contact with Mr. Brooks, Trooper Blakely claims to have
seen saw a pack of cigarettes sitting on the front passenger seat with two cigarettes
within it. He also claims the pack of cigarettes contained a small plastic bag which
contained a crystal substance which he believed to be methamphetamine. In his Affidavit
of Probable Cause, Trooper Blakely does not explain how he could see a small plastic
bag within the cigarette pack nor how he knew it contained methamphetamine. Trooper
Blakely also claims that he could also smell the odor of marijuana in the vehicle, and
could plainly see a small metal cone, which he believed to be the top portion of a
.\IE\IOR\NDU\l OF L\ WIN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO Sl'PPRESS

2

marijuana pipe sitting in the center console. Trooper Blakely asked Mr. Brooks about
methamphetamine use, which he denied. Trooper Blakely claims Brooks later admitted to
using methamphetamine tvvo months ago. Trooper Blakely reached in the vehicle and
retrieved the cigarette box containing what he believed to be methamphetarnine.
Trooper Blakely told Mr. Brooks to exit the vehicle. He placed Mr. Brooks in
handcuffs and instructed him he was being detained. While searching the interior of the
vehicle, Trooper Blakely claims to have found a marijuana pipe behind the driver's seat.
He also claims to have located a blue zipper pouch in the top zipper compartment of a
suitcase. Within the pouch, he located two injection needles, a spoon, rubber band, and
baggies. Trooper Blakely tested the crystal substance using a Narcotics Identification Kit
(NIK.). The test resulted 'in a presumptive positive for methamphetamine. According to
Trooper Blakely, the total gram weight vvas .4grams.
Mr. Brooks is currently charged with felony possession of methamphetamine and
possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to use it.

APPLICABLE LAW
Idaho State Law
Idaho Code, Section 49-654 states: "Basic rule and maximum speed limits. ( l) No
person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions
and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. Consistent Yvith the

foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed when approaching and
crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing, when approaching and going around a curve,
\lE:VIORANDl;\I OF LAW IN Sl'PPORT
OF :'vlOTION TO SCPPRESS
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approaching a hillcrest, when traveling upon any narro\v or winding highway, and when
special hazards exist \Vith respect

to

pedestrians or other traffic or by reason

or

highway conditions."
Idaho Code, Section 49-655 states: '"Minimum speed regulation. No person shall drive a
motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede the nom1al and reasonable movement of traffic
except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with the law."
Idaho Code, Section 49-808 states, in part: ·'Turning movements and required
signals. ( 1) No person shall tum a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or left upon a
highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and until the movement can be made with
reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate signal.
(2) A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be given
continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways and before turning from a
parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in

all other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle
before turning (emphasis added).''
Searche and Seizure Law
Article l, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution states: ·'The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated ... "unless a valid warrant is issued. The Fourth Amendment to
Constitution of the United States contains the identical language.
However. searches and seizures can be reasonable without a warrant under certain
circumstances. A stop and investigatory detention is a recognized exception to the warrant
.\lE\IOR.\NDU\I OF LAW IN Sl'PPORT
OF .\IOTION TO SlPPRESS

requirement. Teny v. Ohio, 392 U.S. l, 88 S. Ct. 1868 ( 1968). Whenever an officer stops an
individual and restrains their freedom, even momentarily, that person is seized with the meaning
of the Folllih Amendment, and therefore, the stop and detention must comply the constitution
standards of reasonableness. Id; J\falfer

(~/Clayton.

113 Idaho 817, 819, 748 P.2d 401 (1988);

and State v. Waldie, 126 Idaho 864, 893 P.2d 811 (Ct. App. 1995).
Warrantless searches and seizures are considered unreasonable per se unless they come
within one of the few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant
requirement. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991); State v. Henderson. 114 Idaho
293, 295, 756 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1988); .V!etzger, 144 Idaho at 399, 162 P.3d at 778.
An officer may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile, including any
containers, packages or compmtments located

ins~de

the automobile which are capable of

concealing the object of the search, under the following circumstances:

(1) the officer has probable cause to believe that the automobile contains
contraband or evidence of a crime; and
(2) the automobile is readily mobile.
Wyonzing v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119 S.Ct. 1297 ( 1999); United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280
( 1925); State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 979 P.2d 1199 ( 1999); State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho
894, 821 P.2d 949 ( 1991 ); State v. Bottelson,102 Idaho 90, 625 P.2d 1093 (1981 ); and State
v.

Braendle, No. 24716 (Idaho Ct.App. No. 5 2/8/00).
Probable cause to believe an automobile contains contraband or evidence of a

crime must be based on objective facts which would be sufficient to convince a magistrate
to issue a warrant under similar circumstances. See Ross; Stwe v. Murphy, 129 Idaho 861,
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934 P.2d 34 (Ct.App. 1997); Ramirez; and State v. Shepherd, 118 Idaho 12 L 795 P.2d 15
(Ct.App. 1990). In determining if probable cause exists a magistrate must consider the
officer's training and experience. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367
(1948); Afurphy; and Ramirez. In addition, the magistrate must evaluate the facts using a
flexible common-sense approach based on the totality of the circumstances. See Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302 (1949); and Rarnirez. Therefore, the proper

inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the officer's circumstances would believe that
there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence was located in a particular place.
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983); and Shepherd.
Evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of an individual's Fourth
Ame.ndment rights must be suppressed, as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341(1914);1\fupp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81S.Ct.1684 (1961); and
State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927).

CONCLUSION
Based upon the aforementioned facts and legal precedents, Defendant respectfully
requests the Corni suppress all the evidence and statements obtained as a result of the
searches and seizures that took place on May 12, 2012.

Defendant reserves the right to

supplement this brief with additional briefing, case law, and testi
DATED

thisdY~ay of June, 2012.

LA
Assistant Public Defender
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6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the£day of June, 2012 served a true and coJTect copy of the
within and foregoing document upon the following: by placing copies of the same in the
designated courthouse box of the office(s) indicated below.

Bryan F. Taylor
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell. Idaho 83605
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jbt
BRYAN F. TAYLOR
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 454-73 91

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

THE STATE OF IDAHO
CASE NO. CR2012-12437
Plaintiff,
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

VS.

MATTHEW 0 BROOKS,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the State ofidaho, by and through its attorney, JOSHUA B. TAYLOR
and does hereby object to the Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
I.

Statement of Facts
On May 12, 2012 at 4:30 in the afternoon Trooper Blake Higley saw a blue Ford

Thunderbird headed eastbound on Interstate 84 just west of Caldwell. Trooper Higley noticed
the Thunderbird was traveling below the speed limit. Trooper Higley confinned the speed by
radar as 60 mph in a 75 mph zone - 15 mph below the limit.

He saw the Thunderbird change

lanes "abruptly" with a brief signal that lasted less than five seconds. Trooper Higley observed
these actions between the Parma exit west of Caldwell to the middle Caldwell exit by the Pizza

OBJECTION TO MOTION TO
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Hut. Trooper Higley followed the Thunderbird for almost two-and-a-half minutes before he
pulled it over. During the two-and-a-half minutes it appears from the video

the Thunderbird

continued to drive below the speed limit.
The defense brief stated Mr. Brooks slowed down with other cars to avoid a crash on the
right shoulder of the freeway. The defense, at the time it filed the motion to suppress, did not
have the advantage of Trooper Higley's in car video. The in car video does not show a wreck on
the shoulder of the freeway at any time from the Panna exit all the way to the Pizza Hut exit.
Trooper Higley stopped Mr. Brooks for failing to signal for 5 seconds on a controlled
access highway (See I.C. § 49-808). He approached the passenger side of the Thunderbird and
helped Mr. Brooks roll down his window. Trooper Higley smelled the odor of marijuana in the
Thunderbird, saw a small metal cone used to smoke marijuana in the center console, and saw two
I

cigarettes and a baggie of methamphetamine sticking out of a cigarette box on the passenger seat.
The defendant was the only passenger in the car. Trooper Higley asked Mr. Brooks when he last
used methamphetamine. The defendant denied any methamphetamine use. Trooper Higley
reached inside the car and grabbed the cigarette box containing the methamphetamine and asked,
"Then what's this?" Mr. Brooks initially denied methamphetamine use and claimed the cigarette
pack belonged to a hitchhiker he picked up. The defendant later admitted he used
methamphetamine.
II.

The Law and Analvsis.

A.

The seizure of the Thunderbird for a traffic stop.

Trooper Higley had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant based
upon the totality of the circumstances.

OBJECTION TO MOTION TO
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A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and thus
implicates the Fourth Amendment (as applied to the State's by the Fourteenth Amendment).

State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996), citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-96, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 809 P.2d
522 (Ct.App.1991). The traffic stop must therefore be supported by a "reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws." Id. "The
reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the
time of the stop [and] this reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause, but
more than speculation or instinct on the part of an officer." Id. citing State v. Naccarato, 126
Idaho 10, 12 (Ct. App. 1994) overruled on other grounds by State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255 (2000)
(emphasis added).
I

Thus we must determine whether, based on the "totality of the circumstances," Trooper
Higley had a reasonable and articulable suspicion the Thunderbird was being driven contrary to
traffic laws. Trooper Higley saw the defendant drive the Thunderbird 15 mph below the speed
limit. The slow speed drew Trooper Higley's attention to the Thunderbird. He then saw the
Thunderbird fail to signal for five seconds before changing lanes on a controlled access highway.

See I.C. § 49-808.
In addition to the stop for failing to signal for more than five seconds and for an "abrupt"
lane change, driving slowly can be a factor in an officer's decision to pull over a car. See State v.

Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 209 (Ct.App. 1998) (holding that, even though Flowers' car never left
his lane entirely, his weaving pattern within the lane combined with his tires touching the center
line twice and the fog line once, in addition to his slow speed, fonned a reasonable and
articulable reason for the stop); see also, State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct.App. 1996)
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(finding that a combination of factors, specifically when Atkinson's left tires crossed the center
and then touched the center line again two blocks later, provided a reasonable and articulable
reason for the stop.).
The failure to signal for more than five seconds by itself gave Trooper Higley a
"reasonable and articulable suspicion" for the stop, but the slow speed also contributed to the
reason for the stop. The slow speed and the failure to signal for five seconds combined and
formed a driving pattern which stood out to Trooper Higley. Based on the "totality of the
circumstances" present to Trooper Higley at that moment he decided to stop the car. Trooper
Higley conducted a lawful traffic stop because he had a "reasonable and articulable suspicion"
for the stop: a failure to signal for more than five seconds, an abrupt lane change, and a speed 15
mph below the speed limit.
B.

The Seizure of the Cigarette ack.

Trooper Higley was in a 1) lawful position to view the methamphetamine and 2) it was
immediately apparent to Trooper Higley that the items viewed were contraband or evidence of a
crime. See State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 99 (Ct.App. 2002). Finally, Trooper Higley could
reach inside the car to seize the methamphetamine under the automobile exception to the wainnt
requirement. See State v. Buti, 131Idaho793, (Ct.App. 1998).
Once Trooper Higley stopped the Thunderbird and approached the passenger side
window, the plain view doctrine allowed Trooper Higley to reach inside the car and seize the
cigarette pack. The "plain view doctrine" applies when two conditions are met: "l) there must
be a lawful intrusion or the officer must otherwise properly be in position to view a particular
area, and 2) it must be immediately apparent that items viewed are contraband or evidence of a
crime." State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 99 (Ct.App. 2002); citing Horton v. California, 496
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U.S. 128, 135-36 (1990), State v. Buti, 131Idaho793, 799 (Ct.App. 1998);
129 Idaho 155, 158 (Ct.App. 1996). Trooper Higley was standing outside

v.Hagedorn,
passenger

door of the Thunderbird on the side of a highway open to the public. Therefore, Trooper Higley
stood "properly in a position to view a particular area." Trooper Higley could smell the odor of
marijuana, see the metal cone of a marijuana pipe, and see two cigarettes and a baggie of what
appeared to be meth sticking out of a cigarette pack. These items were "immediately apparent"
to Trooper Higley as "contraband or evidence of a crime." Because Trooper Higley stood in a
lawful place and the contraband was immediately apparent, he could then seize the items so long
as they were in a place where he had a lawful right to be, otherwise, he would have to obtain a
search warrant. See Buti at 799, citing Horton at 137.
In this case, Trooper Higley did not have a lawful right to reach inside the car, but Idaho
case law allows Trooper Higley to reach inside the car and seize the evidence under the
"automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment. State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793 (1998). Officers
in Buti were looking for a burglar wearing a blue sweatshirt. Id. at 795. After stopping a car
with suspect's inside who matched the description given by the victim, an officer spotted a blue
sweatshirt inside the car. Id. The officer reached inside the car and grabbed it. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Buti pointed out that the test for applying the "plain view"
doctrine has yet another element: "the officer [must] have a 'lawful right of access to the object
itself."' Buti at 799, citing Horton at 137. The court then went on to say that the officer did not
have a lawful right of access to the sweatshirt because it was inside the suspect's car. Id. at 800.
However, Buti then allowed the sweatshirt to be seized under the fourth amendment exception to
the warrant requirement under the "automobile exception." Id. citing Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925) (holding that the search of "a ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile for
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contraband goods" is different that the search of "a store, dwelling house, or other strncture"
because "a vehicle can be quickly moved") at 153; and State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894 (

1).

The facts under this case are the same. The trooper spotted methamphetamine and drug
paraphernalia inside the defendant's car. The trooper still had no legal right to access the car, but
the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement allowed the trooper to reach inside
the car and seize the evidence without first taking the time to obtain a warrant.
III. Conclusion
The State respectfully requests this court to uphold Trooper Higley's stop and eventual
seizure of the methamphetamine and marijuana pipe.

DATED this

tli~
, ......-ciay of August, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on or about this
t~
day of August, 2012, I
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrumenttO be served upon the attorney for the
defendant by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:
Canyon County Public Defender
Lary Sisson, esq.
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() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
() Hand Delivered
(X) Placed in Court Basket
() Overnight Mail
() Facsimile
() E-Mail

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PRESIDING: THOMAS J. RYAN DATE: AUGUST 16, 2012
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.

COURT MINUTE
CASE NO: CR2012-12437-C
CR2012-12215-C
TIME: 1:30 P.M.

)

MATTHEW 0. BROOKS,
Defendant.

)

DCRT4 (135-239)

)
)

REPORTED BY: Kim Saunders

This having been the time heretofore set for motion hearing in the above
entitled matters, the State was represented by Mr. Josh Taylor, Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney for Canyon County, Idaho; and the defendant was not present in court and
represented by Mr. Lary Sisson.
The Court called the case and advised counsel the defendant had attempted to
file documents pro se and provided the original to defense counsel and a copy to the
State. The Court indicated it had not reviewed that motion in detail, however the Court
believed the general thrust of the motions was that the Court lacked jurisdiction, that the
State of Idaho was not an appropriate plaintiff, that the information in the complaint was
defective, and several other allegations.

COURT MINUTE
AUGUST 14, 2012

As there appeared to be challenges at every stage, the Court wanted it noted
that the defendant was not present. It was the Court's understanding that Mr. Sisson
had inquired of the Court's secretary whether the defendant could appear at this hearing
via telephone.

Mr. Sisson had been advised that the defendant was required to be

present, although the defendant could waive his presence pursuant to Idaho Criminal
Rule 43, which the Court reviewed for the record.
In answer

the Court's inquiry, Mr. Sisson indicated the defendant did not have

transportation or funding to be here today.

After discussing the issue with the

defendant, the defendant chose to waive his presence. Mr. Sisson indicated he would
be requesting a copy of the audio as well as a transcript for the defendant to review.
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Sisson indicated there was a recording of
the stop and the parties were stipulating to its admission as well as stipulating to the
court reporter not having to take a verbatim of that recording.
The defense's first witness, BLAKE HIGLEY, was called, sworn by the clerk and
direct examined.
The video of the stop was published to the Court.
The witness was cross-examined, examined by the Court, and continued crossexamined.
The witness was excused.
The Court determined neither counsel had any further testimony to present.
Mr. Sisson presented argument in support of the motion.
COURT MINUTE
AUGUST 14, 2012
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The Court noted that nothing in the defense's motion raised the concerns
expressed in Mr. Sisson's argument.
The Court indicated that based upon the evidence, the contraband was in plain
view of the officer, which meant the plain view doctrine provided an exception to the
warrant requirement.

However, first the officer must be lawfully making the initial

intrusion, which defense counsel was arguing against.

There was no doubt in the

Court's mind that once they were past that threshold question, the doctrine of plain view
applied.
The is'sue of the language of 49-808(2) had not been raised in the briefing and
the Court believed the State should have a fair opportunity to reply to that issue. The
Court indicated it would allow the parties an additional fourteen (14) days to brief the
issue of the language of 49-808(2) and would take the argument today under
consideration.
Mr. Taylor advised the Court Mr. Sisson had sent him an e-mail regarding this
issue, however, he would like the time to brief the issue.
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Sisson indicated he wanted to request a
transcript and recording of this hearing.
The Court indicated it would be easy to provide the defendant with a recording of
this hearing.

However, the Court wished to proceed with the additional briefing and

make a decision before making a decision as to whether a transcript should be made for
purposes of an appeal.
COURT MINUTE
AUGUST 14, 2012
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In answer to Mr. Sisson's inquiry, the Court indicated he could submit an order to
provide a recording of this hearing for free to the defendant.
Mr. Sisson requested the defendant be allowed to appear for the pre-trial
telephonically.
The Court noted the fourteen (14) day time period was past the date of the pretrial. Therefore, the Court vacated the current pre-trial and re-set the pre-trial to

the 1ath day of September, 2012 at 1 :30 p.m. before this Court.
For the record, the Court admitted State's exhibit #1, the recording of the stop.

COURT MINUTE
AUGUST 14, 2012
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l\1ARK J. MJMURA
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
LARY G. SISSON
510 Arthur St.
Caldwell, ID 83605
Telephone: (208) 639-4610
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611
Idaho State Bar No. 6072
Attorneys for Defendant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO.: CR-2012-12437-C
CR-2012-12215-C

~

DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
TO SUPPRESS

vs.
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS,
Defendant.

TO: THE HONORABLE COURT AND THE CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING
ATTORNEY

COMES NOW Defendant, by and through his attorneys of record, the Canyon County
Public Defender's Office, and hereby provides his Supplemental Brief in Support of Defendant's
Motion to Suppress.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On May 12, 2012, at approximately 4:30 p.m. Trooper Blake Higley, stopped a blue Ford
Thunderbird eastbound Interstate 84 in Canyon, County Idaho. The driver of the vehicle later
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identified himself as Matthew 0. Brooks (DOB

Trooper Blakely alleged pulled

Mr. Brooks over because Mr. Brooks failed to provide a continuous signal for at least five (5)
seconds prior to making a lane change on Interstate Highway 84.
As Trooper Blakely observed the vehicle traveling in the left lane, Trooper Bla..1<:ely
believed that the vehicle signaled briefly, for less than two seconds and changed into the right
lane. According to Trooper Blakely, the lane change was abrupt and sudden. Mr. Brooks was
traveling at approximately 55 miles per hour just before and as he was changing lanes.
Upon making his initial contact with Mr. Brooks, Trooper Blakely claims to have seen
saw a pack of cigarettes sitting on the front passenger seat with two cigarettes within it. He also
claims the pack of cigarettes contained a small plastic bag which contained a crystal substance
which he believed to be methamphetamine. In his Affidavit of Probable Cause, Trooper Blakely
does not explain how he could see a small plastic bag within the cigarette pack nor how he knew
it contained methamphetamine.

However, at a hearing on the Motion to Suppress, Trooper

Blakely clarified that he was approximately 2 feet away from the pack of cigarettes, and that the
plastic baggie and its crystal substance were plainly in his view inside the open package of
cigarettes.
Trooper Blakely also claims that he could also smell the odor of marijuana in the vehicle,
and could plainly see a small metal cone, which he believed to be the top portion of a marijuana
pipe sitting in the center console. Trooper Blakely asked Mr. Brooks about methamphetamine
use, which he denied. Trooper Blakely claims Brooks later admitted to using methamphetamine
two months ago.

Trooper Blakely reached in the vehicle and retrieved the cigarette box

containing what he believed to be methamphetamine.
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Trooper Blakely told Mr. Brooks to exit the vehicle. He placed Mr. Brooks in handcuffs
and instructed him he was being detained. While searching the interior of the vehicle, Trooper
Blakely claims to have found a marijuana pipe behind the driver's seat. He also claims to have
located a blue zipper pouch in the top zipper compartment of a suitcase. Within the pouch, he
located two injection needles, a spoon, rubber band, and baggies. Trooper Blakely tested the
crystal substance using a Narcotics Identification Kit (NIK.). The test resulted in a presumptive
positive for methamphetamine. According to Trooper Blakely, the total gram weight was
.4grams.
Mr. Brooks was charged with felony possession of methamphetamii1e and possession of
drug paraphernalia with the intent to use it. On June 29, 2012, Defendant's attorney filed a
timely Motion to Suppress. A hearing on the Motion to S,uppress was held on August 16, 2012.
Trooper Blakely testified at that hearing. In addition, by stipulation the parties admitted into
evidence a video recording (also containing audio) from Trooper Higley's patrol vehicle showing
Defendant's lane change, the stopping of the Defendant's vehicle, and Trooper Higley ta..lcing Mr.
Brooks into custody prior to a search of Mr. Brooks' vehicle.
At the conclusion of the Motion to Suppress Hearing, the Court gave both parties an
additional fourteen (14) days to supplement their legal positions with briefs.

APPLICABLE LAW

Idaho State Law
Idaho Code, Section 49-808 states, in part: "Turning movements and required
signals. (1) No person shall tum a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or left upon a
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highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and until the movement can be

with

reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate signal.
(2)

signal of intention to tum or move right or left when required shall be given

continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways and before turning from a
parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in
all other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (JOO) feet traveled by the vehicle
before turning (emphasis added)."

Idaho Code, Section 73-102(1) states, in part: "The compiled laws establish the law of
this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their provisions and all proceedings
under them are to be liberally construed, with a view to effect their objects and to promote
justice."
Idaho Code, Section 73-113 states, in part: "Words and phrases are construed according
to the context and the approved usage of the language .... "
Search and Seizure Law
Aiticle 1, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution states: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated ... " unless a valid warrant is issued. The Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States contains the identical language.
However, searches and seizures can be reasonable without a warrant under certain
circumstances. A stop and investigatory detention is a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). \Vbenever an officer stops an
individual and restrains their freedom, even momentarily, that person is seized with the meaning
DEFE1\1DANT'S SUPPLEMEl'ffAL BRIEF
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of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore, the stop and detention must comply the constitution
standards of reasonableness. Id; Matter of Clayton, 113 Idaho 8

819, 748 P.2d 401 (1988);

and State v. Waldie, 126 Idaho 864, 893 P.2d 811 (Ct. App. 1995).
Warrantless searches and seizures are considered unreasonable per se unless they come
within one of the few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant
requirement. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991); State v. Henderson, 114 Idal10
293, 295, 756 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1988); Metzger, 144 Idaho at 399, 162 P.3d at 778.
An officer may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile, including any containers,
packages or compartments located inside the automobile which are capable of concealing the
object of the search, under the following circumstances:
(1) the officer has probable cause to believe that the automobile contains
contraband or evidence of a crime; and
(2) the automobile is readily mobile.

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119 S.Ct. 1297 (1999); United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280 (1925);

State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 979 P.2d 1199 (1999); State v. Gallegos, 120 IdaJ10 894, 821
P.2d 949 (1991); State v. Bottelson,102 Idaho 90, 625 P.2d 1093 (1981); and State v. Braendle,
No. 24716 (Idaho Ct.App. No. 5 2/8/00).
Probable cause to believe an automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime
must be based on objective facts which would be sufficient to convince a magistrate to issue a
"Warrant under similar circumstances. See Ross; State v. Murphy, 129 Idaho 861, 934 P.2d 34
(Ct.App. 1997); Ramirez; and State v. Shepherd, 118 Idaho 121, 795 P.2d 15 (Ct.App. 1990). In
determining if probable cause exists a magistrate must consider the officer's training and
DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
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experience. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367 (1948); Murphy;
addition, the magistrate must evaluate the facts using a flexible common-sense approach based
on the totality of the circumstances. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302
(1949); and Ramirez. Therefore, the proper inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the
officer's circumstances would believe that there was a fair probability that contraband or
evidence was located in a particular place. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317
(1983); and Shepherd.
Evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of an individual's Fourth
Amendment rights must be suppressed, as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961); and State
v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927).

Idaho Case Law
A statute must be construed so that effect is given to every word and clause of a statute.
State v. Baer, 132 Idaho 416, 417-18, 973 P.2d 768, 769-70 (Ct.App.1999). When interpreting

the meaning of language contained in a statute, a court must interpret the statute in order to give
effect to the legislature's intent and purpose. State v. Coleman, 128 Idaho 466, 469, 915 P.2d 28,
31 (Ct.App.1996). There is no occasion for construction of a statute where the language of a
statute is plain and unambiguous. State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581 (1996).
"The plain, obvious and rational meaning is always preferred to any hidden, narrow or irrational
meaning." State v. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 40, 966 P.2d 33, 40 (Ct.App.1998).

LEGAL ARGUlVIENT

DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEl'vIBi'i'T AL BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF MOTIOK TO SUPPRESS

6

To begin, a review of Idaho case law shows that neither the Idaho Court of Appeals nor
the Idaho Supreme Court has issued an opinion interpreting the

or

required by Idaho Code, Section 49-808(2) for turning or moving a vehicle upon a highway. 1
Consequently, applicable case precedent does not exist.
Therefore, a review of the tum signal laws throughout the United States was undertaken
to see if other jurisdictions have a law identical or similar to §49-808. If so, then the thought was
perhaps their appellate courts had interpreted the meaning of their statutes which could then be
applied in this instance. The search did not produce any applicable case precedents. However, it
did yield not only interesting, but instructive, information about how other states require the use
of tum signals before a driver changes lane on a highway.
Louisiana, Kansas, Oklahoma and Wyollfing all have statutes that use the identical phrase
contained in Idaho's statute which requires use of a signal for" ... not less than the last one
hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning." Surrounding and other western states,
such as Washington, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Colorado, California and Texas, do not have the
exact language of Idaho's statute but they do, at a minimum, require a signal to be used for at
least 100 feet before a vehicle turns or moves left or right. However, Utah's applicable statute
requires at least two (2) seconds of signaling before a proper la..11e change may be made. 2

1 State v. Debrewe, 133 Idaho 663, 991 P. 2d 388 (Idaho App. 1999) and Burton v. State, Dept. of
Transp., 149 Idaho 746, 240 P.3d 933 (Idaho App. 2010) both dealt with the issue of whether a signal

was required in certain situations. The need for using a turn signal is not an issue in this case so the
holdings in those two cases are not applicable to this matter.
2 Utah Code,§ 41-6a-804(1)(b)
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On the other hand, no other state in the United States uses the phrase, " ... before turning
a parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5)

"'-''-'VH\.l.0

." with regards to turning or moving from a parked position. Other states, such as Pennsylvania,
require a signal if a vehicle is moving from a parked position. 3 But, no other state requires a
driver to signal for a specific period of time before moving from a parked position.
Ultimately, the uniqueness of the portion ofidaho' s law regarding the turning from a
parked position did not lead to any statutory interpretations from other jurisdictions which would
assist the Court in this matter.
Therefore, the Court is left to interpret §49-808(2) without the assistance of other legal
opinions. Hence, as cited above, the statute must be construed so that effect is given to every
word and clause of a statute. State v. Baer. When interpreting the meaning of language
contained in a statute, a court must interpret the statute in order to give effect to the legislature's
intent and purpose. State v. Coleman. There is no occasion for construction of a statute where
the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous. State v. McCoy. The plain, obvious and
rational meaning is always preferred to any hidden, narrow or irrational meaning. State v.
Arrasmith.

Subsection 1 of §49-808 should first be analyzed. This subsection states:
"No person shall tum a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or left
upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and until the
movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate
signal."

3 75 Pa.C.5., §3334
DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
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It seems plain and unambiguous from this subsection of the statute that two requirements
must be met by drivers when they are moving or turning vehicles on to, off of, or within
highways. Those two requirements are the movement must be made with reasonable safety and
an appropriate signal must be made before the movement is initiated. Moreover, those two
requirements are the guiding principles that must be considered in order to give effect to the
legislature's intent and purpose.
The first sentence of Subsection 2 of §49-808 is instructive as to the legislature's intent
and purpose in three ways. To begin, the sentence acknowledges that signal of intention should
occur in three very distinct situations, namely: a) turning, b) moving right, and c) moving left.
By using the conjunction "or" the legislature made it clear that in any one of these three
scenarios a signal is necessary.
Second, the sentence also shows that the legislature also built flexibility into the statute.
In other words, by adding the phrase "when required" right after " ... tum or move right or left"

the legislature contemplated that there may be a scenario when a signal may not be necessary
before turning or moving right or left. A specific scenario was not identified because statutes as well as society's view of what is legal and not legal - change constantly. Therefore if there
ever became a situation when signally was not necessary, §49-808 is prepared to deal with that
situation without the need of it being amended.
Third, the first sentence commands (by using the word "shall") that if a signal is required
it must be given continuously to warn other traffic. To the chagrin of perhaps everyone involved
in this matter, the statute does a poor job of defining the word "continuously".
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The next key phrase in the statute says, "On controlled-access highways and before
turning from a parked position .... " For the purposes of this case, the defendant is not
contesting - and in fact agrees - that Interstate 84 is a controlled-access highway. However, the
controlled-access part of the phrase is linked with the phrase "turning from a parked position"
with the conjunction "and".
There are a number of different definitions for the word "and". However, the plain,
obvious and rational meaning is always preferred to any hidden, narrow or in-ational meaning.

State v. Arrasmith. In other words, "and" means and - which is to say it is being used as a
function word to indicate a connection between two conditions. Consequently, when a vehicle is

both on a controlled-access highway and, while on the controlled-access highway the vehicle
desires to move from a parked position, before turning from that parked position then (and only
then) must the signal be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds. This interpretation
is consistent with the mandate in Idaho Code, Section 73-113 which states, in part: "Words and
phrases are construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language .... "
It is anticipated that the State will argue that "the five second rule" applies in two
separate and distinct situations. One would be when a vehicle is turning, moving right or moving
left on a controlled access highway. The second would be when a vehicle (regardless of what
type of highway it is on) is turning from a parked position. However, this interpretation ignores
the plain and unambiguous reading of the statute. In addition, it assumes that writers of the
legislation and legislators themselves did not understa11d the difference between the meaning of
the words "and" and "or".

DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
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Put more simply, if the legislature wanted to the five second rule to apply to the
aforementioned two scenarios, then they would have simply passed the statute so it would read,
" ... On controlled-access highways, QI before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be
given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds .... " In the alternative, the legislature
could have written Subsection 2 so it would read:
A signal of intention to tum or move right or left when required shall be given
continuously to warn other traffic. A signal shall be given continuously for not
less than five (5) seconds when:
(a) on controlled-access highways, or (b) before turning from a parked position.
In all other instances, a signal shall be given continuously for not less than the last
one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.
However, that is not how the legislature chose how to write and pass this particular
statute. In fact, it is arguable that they wrote this statute in its original form in order to avoid
making it more complicated and to avoid repeating phrases such as "continuously for not less
than."
It should also be noted that the sentence immediately preceding the phrase in dispute, the
legislature demonstrated its knowledge of the differences between the conjunctions "or" and
"and" and how to use them properly. As previously explained, the legislature used the word "or"
to make it clear that whether a vehicle was turning, moving right or moving left it had to signal
to warn other traffic.
The last key phrase in Subsection 2 states: " ... and, in all other instances, for not less
than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning." It is anticipated that
the State may argue that the use of "and" between "controlled-access highway" and "from a
parked position" and proposed by the defense is incorrect because the word "and" followed by
DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
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"in all other instances" is not used as a connection between two conditions. Instead the second
"and" is being used as a supplementary explanation of a different standard

a different

situation. Therefore, the first "and" following "controlled-access highway" is also used to link a
second situation (i.e. "from a parked position") that is unrelated to "controlled-access highway"
but also requiring a five second signal.
If the previous paragraph is confusing, then it adeptly illustrates that the potential
argument found therein is not only confusing as well, but also implausible and improper. In
other words, statutes are meant to be written so that they are easily understood. Consequently,
explaining the meaning of a statute should also be easy. Any explanation of a statute that is not
easily conveyed suggests that the explanation itself is not accurate.
In any event, the last phrase of," ... and, in all other instances, for not less than the last
one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning" relates to the minimum amount of
distance a vehicle must use a signal before turning, moving right or moving left except for the
one situation where a vehicle is on a controlled-access highway and turning from a parked
position. The word "and" used at the beginning of this last phrase and coupled with "in all other
instances" is being used as a supplementary explanation to designate the standard for tum signal
use in all other factual situations. It appears that the legislature was trying not to be too verbose
by using the second "and" instead of more definitely delineating the standard for signaling in all
scenanos.
Finally, let's go back to hov; other states word their statutes in regards to using tum
signals. It is no secret that legislative bodies often use the same language, or highly similar
language, when writing legislation. Sometimes that is done because the template laws have
DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
IN SlJPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS

12

passed judicial scmtiny and thus become more difficult to legally challenge

mher jurisdictions.

Sometimes these laws are based on model laws researched and propagated

national groups

with expertise as to the subject matter. In other situations, it is simply easier and quicker to use
some other states' laws as basis for writing a law in another state.
Whatever the case may be, in regards to using turning signals the general standard in the
western United States seems to be that a vehicle must signal for at least (100) feet before turning
or moving right or left. A few states have added additional restrictions and one (Utah) has gone
with a two second mle. However, for the most part these western states (including Idaho) have
determined that 100 feet is sufficient to safely notify other driver's of a person's intent to move
or turn.
The facts established at the Motion to Suppress Hearing show that

. Brooks was

traveling at approximately 55 mph when he was using his tum signal and actually changing lanes
on the highway. That means that he was traveling at approximately 80.66 feet per second.
Officer Higley testified that Mr. Brooks signaled for less than 2 seconds. A signal for just over 1
second (precisely 1.25 seconds) would be enough to meet the 100 foot minimum requirement in
§49-808(2).
It should also be noted that Idaho has carved out a unique exception to the "100 foot
mle." Specifically, a vehicle must be on a controlled-access highway. Defendant argues that in
addition to being on a controlled access highway, the vehicle must be turning from a parked
position. It is certainly conceivable that a vehicle could be parked on a controlled access
highway due to a vehicle malfunction, an accident, a road hazard, or even heavy, rush-hour
traffic. A vehicle could be stopped in preparation for finding an opening in traffic so it could
DEFENDAt'llT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
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merge from one controlled-access highway to another. In those types of scenarios, it would
make sense that the legislature would require more time for signaling- especially

a vehicle

is going from a parked position into traffic that could be going as fast as 75 miles per hour.
In brief summary, the plain and unambiguous reading of §49-808(2), together with the
little tangential evidence available, does not support the conclusion that all lane changes on a
controlled-access highway must be for a minimum of five (5) seconds. Instead, the proper
interpretation of the statue is that all lane changes or turns, except in one specific instance, need
only be preceded by a signal for" ... not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the
vehicle before turning." The one exception to the "100 feet rule" would be if a vehicle is both on
a controlled access highway and at the same time turning from a parked position. In that case
then the "five second rule" would apply.
In this case, Trooper Higley misunderstood the law and erroneously stopped Mr. Brooks
even though he had signaled at least 100 feet before changing lanes. Because the stop was
unlawful, then any evidence obtained after the stop must be suppressed.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the aforementioned facts and legal precedents, Defendant respectfully
requests the Court suppress all the evidence and statements obtained as a result of the searches
and seizures that took place on May 12, 2012.
DATED this Jq·fvday of August, 2012.
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IYARY G. SisSON

Assistant Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

noi'1i---

I hereby certify that on theo<-_
I day of August, 2012 served a true and correct copy of the within
and foregoing document upon the following: by placing copies of the same in the designated
courthouse box of the office( s) indicated below.

Bryan F. Taylor
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
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LARY G. SISSON
Mimura Law Offices,
5 Arthur St.
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 639-4610
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611
Idaho State Bar No. 6072

COUNTY
B HATF1ELD, DEPUTY

Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAL~YON
MAGISTRATE DIVISION

OF IDAHO,
CASE NOS. CR-2012-12437-C /
CR-2012-12215-C

Plaintiff,

MOTION TO APPEAR
TELEPHONICALLY AT PRETRIAL CONFERENCE

vs.
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendant, Matthew 0. Brooks, by and through his attorney of record,
and hereby moves this honorable Court for an Order to allow Defendant to appear by telephone
at the Pre-Trial Conference scheduled in these matter for the 18th day of September, 2012 at 1:30
p.m. This motion is made pursuant to Rule 43 .1 of the Idaho Criminal Rules and is based on the
following:
1.

Defendant lives in Hillsboro, Oregon;

2.

Reasonably speaking, it would take Defendant anywhere from 7 to 9 hours to
drive to Caldwell, Idaho for the Pre-Trial Conference;
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3.

As a result of these criminal charges Defendant has lost his vehicle and Defendant
has lost his job;

4.

Defendant is still unemployed today and still does not own a vehicle;

5.

Consequently, it would place an undue hardship upon Defendant to require him to
personally appear for a hearing that will be relatively short;

6.

Defendant has kept in contact with Pre-Trial Release Services and has not
violated their rules and requirments; and

7.

It is in the interest of judicial economy to grant this motion.

:2,'J+
DATED this _'JU_ day of August, 2012

Lary G. isson
Assistant Public Defender
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I hereby certify that, on the
day of August, 2012, I served a true
coITect
within and foregoing document upon the individual(s) named below in the manner noted:

the

~By depositing copies of the same in the designated courthouse box of the individual listed below.
Brian F. Taylor
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
1115 Albany Street,
Caldwell, ID 83605

~By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, first class.
Matthew 0. Brooks
603 N 1st A venue
Hillsboro, OR 97123

LA
Assistant Public Defender
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G. SISSON
Mimura Law Offices, PLLC
510 Arthur St.
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 639-4610
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611
Idaho State Bar No. 6072
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT

OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

STATE

OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF CANYON
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
STATE OF IDAHO,
CASE NOS. CR-2012-12437-C /
CR-2012-12215-C

Plaintiff,

ORDER ALLO\VING DEFENDANT
TO APPEAR 1'ELEPHONICALL Y
AT PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE

vs.
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS,
Defendant.

THIS MATTER came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to AppeavP
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Telephonically at his Pre-Trial Conference which is scheduled for

September)~,

i•J-

2012 at 1:30

p.m. After review of the motion, and there being good cause;
THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER that Matthew 0. Brooks
may appear by telephone at the Pre-Trial Conference currently scheduled in these matters for the

p: DO /('~
~day of September, 2012 at.J.6(1 p.m., or as soon thereafter as it may be heard.
li 4

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Brooks' attorney shall provide to the court prior to
the hearing the appropriate telephone number by which Defendant shall participate in the
hearing. The Court shall initiate the telephone call to Defendant.

ORDER ALLOWING DEFENTIANT TO APPEAR
TELEPHONICALLY AT PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
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DATED this

')l'>t

day of August, 2012.

THOMAS J. RYAN
District Judge

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

the~{

I hereby certify that on
day of August, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing document upon the following named below in the manner noted:
By depositing copies of the same in the designated courthouse box of the individual(s) listed
below.
Brian F. Taylor
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
1115 Albany Street,
Caldwell, ID 83605
Mimura Law Offices, PLLC
510 Arthur Street
Caldwell, ID 83605

CHRIS YAMAMOTO
Clerk of the District Court

By:~
Deputy Clerk

ORDER ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO APPEAR
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BRYANF. TAYLOR
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 454-73 91

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF CANYON

THE STATE OF IDAHO
CASE NO. CR2012-12437
Plaintiff,
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

vs.
MATTHEW 0 BROOKS,
Defendant.

The State of Idaho, by and through its attorney, Joshua B. Taylor, objects to the
Defendant's Motion to Suppress because LC. § 49-808 is not unconstitutionally vague.
I.

Legal Grounds
The State anticipates the defense will present two objections to the constitutionality of

LC. § 49-808.
1.

Whether LC. § 49-808 is unconstitutionally vague "on its face?"

2.

Whether LC. § 49-808 is unconstitutionally vague "as applied to a complainant's

conduct?"
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Legal Background
This case asks whether LC. § 49-808 can survive an analysis under the

Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Due process requires that all "be informed as to
State commands or forbids" and that "men [and women] of common intelligence" not

the
forced

to guess at the meaning of the criminal law. Burton v. State, Dept o/Transp., 149 Idaho 746,
748 (Ct.App.2010); citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974); State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho
195 (1998). This is commonly referred to as the "void-for-vagueness doctrine." The void-forvagueness doctrine requires that
1)

A statute defining criminal conduct ... be worded with sufficient clarity and

definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, and
2)

The statute be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and

discriminatory enforcement. Burton, 149 Idaho at 746; citing Village of Hoffman Estates v.

Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497-99 (1982); State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706,
711 (2003); State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 34 (Ct.App.2009).
In order for the statute to be "worded with sufficient clarity" it must "give adequate
notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes."

In order for

the statute to be worded in a manner that does not allow police officers to enforce it in an
"arbitrary and discriminatory" way, the statute must "establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement ... " Burton, 149 Idaho at 746; citing Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712; 1\1artin, 148 ldaho
at 35.
III.

Applying the Law to the Facts.
In this case, Trooper Blake Higley saw the defendant drive his car eastbound on Interstate

84 near Caldwell, Idaho. Interstate 84 is a "controlled-access highway." See LC.§ 49-109(5)(b)
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(Any highway or roadway in respect to which owners or occupants of abutting
persons have no legal right of access to or from the highway except at such

and
or in such

manner as may be determined by the public authority ... ). Persons who drive cars and trucks
down Interstate 84 may only exit and enter the freeway at specific points along the route. Traffic
is divided into two lanes in each direction. A "barrow pit" separates each direction of traffic.
At about 2 p.m. on May 12, 2012, Trooper Blake Higley observed the defendant driving
his car 60 mph in a 75 mph zone. Trooper Higley watched the defendant's car and saw it change
lanes from the left lane to the right lane without signaling for more than five seconds before
making the lane change. Trooper Higley saw this as a violation of I.C. §49-808 and he stopped
the defendant's car. In Trooper Higley's report he stated, "the vehicle signaled briefly [from the
left lane], for less than two seconds and (then] changed into the right lane." He added, ''The lane
change was abrupt and sudden."
Trooper Higley stopped the defendant. When Trooper Higley arrived at the passenger
side of the car, he smelled marijuana, he saw metharnphetarnine and a marijuana pipe, he reached
into the car, seized the evidence, and arrested the defendant.
A.

Idaho Code § 49-808 is "Worded with Sufficient Clarity and Definiteness that

Ordinary People Can Understand What Conduct is Prohibited."
There are two separate attacks available to the defense under the Due Process Clause on a
"void-for-vagueness" challenge. The first is that the statute is "vague on its face." The second is
that the statute is "vague as applied to the complainant's conduct." See Burton, 149 Idaho at
748.
1.

The statute is not "void-for-vagueness" on its face because the defense cannot

show that the statute is "impermissibly vague in all of its applications."
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In order to succeed on a challenge under a "void-for-vagueness" charge on the face of the
statute, the court must find the statute is "impermissibly vague

all of its applications." Village

of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. 455 U.S. 489 (1982). In order to interpret
a statute, the court first begins "with an examination of its literal words." State v. Martin, 148
Idaho at 36 (Ct.App.2009). "The statutory language is to be given its plain, obvious, and
rational meaning." Id "A statute is to be construed as a whole without separating one provision
from another." Id. "In attempting to discern and implement the intent of the legislature, a court
may seek edification from the statute's legislative history and contemporaneous context at
enactment." Id. "However, if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, a court need
merely apply the statue without engaging in any statutory construction." Id. "The plain meaning
of a statute wip prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless plain

meaning leads to absurd results." Harris v. Alessi, 141 Idaho 901, 910 (Ct.App.2005); citing
George W Watkins Family v. lvfessenger, 188 Idaho 537, 540 (1990).
Given the whole meaning of the statute, it applies to safe driving. The goal, as stated in
the first paragraph of the statute, is to allow motorists to move only when doing so can be done
"with reasonable safety" and after "giving an appropriate signal." The plain, obvious and
rational meaning is that the statute is to be interpreted in a way to make the highways safe for
everyone who travels upon them. The second paragraph provides, in detail, what it means to
give an "appropriate signal" with (taking the statute as a whole again) "reasonable safety." The
third paragraph requires brake lights and fair warnings for drivers behind us, and the fourth
paragraph says we cannot make goofy signals (those outside of what is an "appropriate signal" such as letting another driver know it is safe to pass by turning on our own blinker, or.stopping
on the side of a road with a turn signal blinker on instead of the hazard lights flashing.
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The statute, taken as a whole, and given its plain meaning, cannot
vague "on its face" because it is not "impermissibly vague

its

The State does not anticipate the defense will make a big argument about

vague on its

face doctrine. Rather, the State anticipates the defense will bring the thrust of its argument
against the "vague as applied" doctrine.

2.

A person of ordinary intelligence can understand the plain, obvious and rational

meaning of the statute, and thus, it is not void-for-vagueness as applied.
The negative treatment of LC. § 49-808 by Burton is instructive on this issue because the
two cases, this case and the Burton case, are factually distinct. In Burton, two lanes of travel in
the same direction merged into one lane of travel. Burton, 149 Idaho at 750. The court
determined that a driver could not determine what to do in that situation because the statute did
i

not make it clear what type of signal "is required when two lanes simply merge." Id. In this
case, the lanes did not merge. Two lanes continued down the highway the entire time the
Trooper followed the defendant. The defendant changed lanes from the left hand lane into the
right hand lane without signaling for five seconds - an issue not at stake in the Burton decision.
In fact, Burton never even considered the issue of how long a signal must be given (the issue in
this case), but rather whether a signal needs to be given at all.
This leads to the nitty gritty of the defense argument, the statute is vague as applied
because it can be read in one of two ways: in one way, both a person who travels down an
uncontrolled highway and a person who moves from a "parked position" must signal for at least
five seconds before moving from one lane to the other; in the other way, the person must be in a
parked position upon the "controlled-access highway" before the requirement to signal for five

OBJECTION TO MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

5

seconds kicks in. The defense version is the latter, that a person must be "parked" along a
"controlled-access highway" in order for the five second rule to apply.
The defense position requires this court to overlook the statute as a whole, to deny the
statute its "plain, obvious and rational" meaning, and to give the statute an "absurd". The plain
language of the statute provides:
A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be given
continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways and before
turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less
than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances, for not less than the last one
hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.

LC. § 49-808, emphasis added.
This result stretches reason because everyone who has ever driven on a controlled-access
highway would know that flying do\vn the road requires a signal of at least jive seconds.
Controlled-access highways in Idaho have speeds up to 75 mph. At 75 mph a person travels 111
feet per second. In order for the defendant's interpretation of the statute to be given its plain,
obvious and rational meaning, a driver on a controlled-access highway would only have to turn
on the blinker, count to one, and then cross from the left lane into the right lane of traffic. At
those speeds and in that amount of time, other drivers would only, if they were lucky, be able to
see the lane-changing driver's blinker once. (And if they were even luckier - not be in the other
lane of travel right next to the moving driver).
The result stretches the plain, obvious and rational meaning when we look at the
defendant's unstated argument - that is: a person only has to give a five second signal when
parked on a freeway. The word park should be given its plain, obvious and rational meaning:

people "park" to go into the mall, they "parallel park," "park at an angle," and park on the side of
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residential streets and downtown city streets. Drivers do not "park" on a freeway;
pull over

stop or run out of gas, but no one "parks" on a freeway.

Looking at the absurdity of only requiring a five second signal when a person is

~~.,·~~

and parked next to a freeway, what do people do who are parallel parked in a spot next to the
courthouse? The defendant's interpretation of the statute would put these poor driver's in the
position where they had to driver 100 feet before turning because these drivers would fall
the second category: "in all other instances, for not less than one hundred (100) feet ... before
turning! Whoa to those people who park in front of the parallel parked driver who needs to get
out of his parking spot. He will have to travel one hundred feet before he can tum because he is
not "parked" on the side of a controlled-access highway. This means the driver would have to go
straight for one hundred feet - over barriers, other cars, and anything else in the way before
being able to tum - but apparently signaling all the way, thank goodness. The rational meaning
of the statute is that turning from a parked position in any place requires five seconds because
you cannot travel 100 feet before you turn.

The plain, obvious and rational meaning of the statute, taken as a whole gives the statute
a "clear and rurnmbiguous interpretation". A driver must signal for five seconds when traveling
down a controlled-access highway, and she must also signal when turning
anywhere (the library, the drug store, city streets, (and yes, along highways

a parked position
in all

instances, she must signal for 100 feet (approaching stop signs, traveling down residential and
city streets). The "Idaho Driver's Manual" states: "Proper signaling may prevent a rear-end
collision. Signals must start at least 100 feet (in business or residential areas) or five seconds (on
freeways or highways) before you tum or change lanes." "Idaho Driver's Manual, April 2011,
p.34.
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

not given an absurd result, leads to the conclusion that the defendant was required to

at

least five seconds continuously in order to "warn other traffic", make the move with "reasonable
safety", and to comply with the reasonable expectations of men and women of ordinary
intelligence who would read the statute.

The trooper's stop of the defendant should be upheld because LC. § 49-808 is not voidfor-vagueness on its face or as applied to these facts.

~
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510 Arthur Street
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

STATE OF IDAHO,
CASE NO. CR-2012-12437-C
CR-2012-12215-C

Plaintiff,

ORDER TO PROVIDE AUDIO
RECORDING

vs.

MATTHEW 0. BROOKS,
Defendant.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon Defendant's oral motion for Clerk
of the Court to provide an audio recording of the Motion to Suppress hearing for these matters,
which was held on August 16, 2012. After considering the Motion along with the previous
proceedings in this matter, and for good cause appearing;
THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Canyon County Court
shall provide to the Public Defender's Office an audio recording of the Motion to Suppress
hearing for these matters, which was held on August 16, 2012.

ORDER TO PROVIDE
AUDIO RECORDING

1

IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the above-listed audio recording
Canyon County Public Defender's Office without cost to
DATED this

J•.fl"

_ll'_

provided

the

office.

day of September, 2012.

THOMAS J. RYAN
District Judge

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

_L!}__ day of September, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of

the Order to Provide Audio Recording upon the individual(s) named below in the manner noted:

ry
--

depositing copies of the same in the designated courthouse box of:

Bryan F. Taylor
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho

~ depositing copies of the same in the designated courthouse box of:
Mimura Law Offices, PLLC
510 Arthur Street
Caldwell, Idaho 836605
j:Yl3~positing

copies of the same in the designated courthouse box of:

/ft!i~'?
t.

Chns Yamamoto
Clerk of the Court

CHRIS YAIVIAMOTO
Clerk of the Court

By:

--~----'='--f--;
_,H-~----
Deputy Clerk
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CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
OFFICES,
MIMURA

2012

Jim Goldmann
510 Arthur Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Phone: (208) 639-4610
Fax: (208) 639-4611
Idaho State Bar No. 8124
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CR-201

12437

Plaintiff,
vs.
MATTHEW 0 BROOKS.

RESPONSE TO STATE'S OBJECTION
TO MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Defendant.

COMES NUW, the Defendant, by and through his attorneys

record the

Canyon County Public Defender's Office and hereby provides this Court and the State of
Idaho, through the Canyon County Prosecutors Office, with this response to the State's
Objection to Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
On September 4, 2012, the State filed an objection only on the grounds of the
anticipated basis of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The pertinent facts in question
are whether Trooper Higley had cause to stop Mr. Brooks for an alleged violation

LC.

§ 49-808(2) when he observed "an abrupt and sudden" lane change after Mr. Brooks

signaled for "less than two seconds" passing a slower moving vehicle while traveling 60
mph in a 75 mph zone.

RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO MOTION TO SUPPRESS

A Person
Ordinary Intelligence Can Not Understand
§ 49-808(2).

Meaning

1. Standard For Statutory Interpretation.
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the Court must give
effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v.
Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685 (1999); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659,
978 P.2d 214, 219, (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App.
2000). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning.
Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. There is no occasion for the Court to resort
to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation

if the language is clear and

unambiguous. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. The Court, when engaging in
statutory construction, has a duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that
intent. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688. Not only must the literal words of the
statute be examined by the Court, but also the context of the words within the statute,
public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. Id.
2. The Language Of LC.§ 49-808(2) Is Clear and Unambiguous: When Driving On
A Controlled Access Highway And Not Turning From A Parked Position, A
Signal Must Be Given Continuously For Not Less Than One Hundred (100) Feet.
The State correctly argues that the Court must look to the plain, obvious and
rational meaning of the I.C. § 49-808(2). However, the State further asks the Court to
create an absurd result that contravenes the correct grammatical interpretation of how the
Statute is written. Specifically, LC. § 49-808(2) states:
A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be
given continuously to warn other traffic. On a controlled access highway
and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given
continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances,
for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle
before turning.
The second sentence of this section is a complex sentence containing an
independent clause with two (2) prepositional phrases modifying a noun and verb joined
by the conjunction "and" to a dependant clause with two (2) prepositional phrases
modifying the same noun and verb.
RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Splitting the sentence into its independent and dependant clauses, results
statements: ( 1)

the

a controlled access highway and before turning from a

parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for five (5) seconds"; and

"In

all other instances [on a controlled access highway], [the signal shall be given] for not
less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning."
Beginning with the sentence preceding the conjunction, the first statement
contains a compound prepositional phrase modifying the noun "signal". The first
element begins with the word "on" used as a function to indicate location of something.
For example, it is akin the following uses of the same word: "on the side of the house"
and "on a string". The second element begins with the word "before" used
synonymously with the phrase "in advance of' or "before". For example, it is akin to the
following phrases: "in advance of coming to the house" or "before walking out the
door." The conjunction "and" used in this phrase means that noun is modified by
statements in this phrase. That is to say, the noun ,directly following is modified in the
following manner: it takes place only on a controlled access highway and before turning

from a parked position.
Secondly, the independent clause includes the preposition "for" creating a
prepositional phrase identifying the duration of time modifying the verb phrase "shall be
given". For example, it is akin to the following uses of the same word: "for five
minutes" and ''for more than 1 year". Taking the parts of this sentence and reordering
them according to their correct grammatical usage results in the following: The signal

when turning from a parked position on a controlled access highway shall be given
continuously for not less than five (5) seconds.
The dependant clause following conjunction includes two (2) prepositional
phrases: (1) "in all other instances"; and (2) "for not less than the last one hundred (100)
feet traveled by the vehicle before turning." This dependant clause begins with a
conjunction creating a relationship to information found elsewhere in the independent
clause preceding it.
The question now becomes, upon what does the dependant clause depend? That

is to say, what do the prepositional phrases "in aH other instances" and "for not less than
one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning" replace and/or modify

RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO MOTION TO SUPPRESS

from the preceding independent clause?
\Vhen reviewing

independent clause, the

is to

the

prepositional phrase modifying the verb phrase in the independent clause with the
prepositional phrase attributable to the same verb phrase in the dependant clause. In this
case, the phrase indicating "duration of time" in the dependant clause would rationally
replace the phrase modifying "the duration of time" in the independent clause. That is to
say, the phrase "for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle
before turning" in the dependant clause should replace the phrase "for not less than five
(5) seconds" in the independent clause.
Next, the question becomes what does the other prepositional phrase ("in

other

instances") in the dependant clause replace and/or modify in the independent clause?
There are three (3) possibilities:
1. Modify both parts of the prepositional phrase in the independent
clause resulting in the following: the signal, in all other instances other

than, on a controlled access highway when turning from a parked position
shall be given continuously for not less than the last one hundred (I 00)
feet traveled by the vehicle before turning;
2. Modify only first part of the prepositional phrase in the
independent clause ("on a controlled access highway") resulting in the
following: the signal before turning from a parked position in all

instances other than when on a controlled access highway shall be given
continuously for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by
the vehicle before turning.
3. Modify only second part of the prepositional phrase in the
independent clause ("before turning from a parked position") resulting in
the following: the signal on a controlled access highway in all instances

other than when turning from a parked position shall be given
continuously for not less than the last one hundred (I 00) feet traveled by
the vehicle before turning.
A(2)(i)

Misinterpreting- The Language ·within This Sentence Could
Result In Non-Rational Results.

RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO •
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The State correctly highlights that there could be absurd results
certain variations of possible meanings of this sentence. For example, if the sentence
were to read "the signal, in all other instances other than on a controlled access highivay

when tuming from a parked position shall be given continuously for not less than

last

one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning, " it could potentially result
in someone having drive one hundred (100) feet from a parked position before being able
to tum from the parked position. As the State highlights, this would be a nonsensical
interpretation; the Defense agrees with the State that this clearly is not an appropriate
rational result. It is important to note that there could be rational applications of this
sentence that are not farcical in their application; however, given the ambiguity of the
results, this not the appropriate meaning of the Statute.
Furthermore, it would be equally absurd if the sentence were to read "the signal

before turning from a parked position in all instances other than when on a controlled
I

access highway shall be given continuously for not less than the last one h~ndred (100)
feet traveled by the vehicle before turning." The same aforementioned result would
ensue. The Defense agrees with the State that this is not an appropriate meaning of the
Statute.
When taken in context of the sentence, the compound prepositional phrnse in the
independent clause modifying the noun includes a location and time element ("before").
It is reasonable, rational and creates a clear and unambiguous meaning to modify only
time element in the prepositional phrase in the independent clause modifying the noun
with the appropriate time element ("in all other instances") in the dependant clause. The
compound nature of the prepositional phrase further indicates that it is appropriate for the
single element dependant clause to only modify a single element of the compound phrase
in the independent clause. Given the absurd or contrary results mentioned above, there is
only one meaning left for the dependant clause: The signal on a controlled access

highway in all instances other than when turning from a parked position shall be given
continuously/or not less than the last one hundred (IOO)feet traveled by the vehicle
before turning.

RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO MOTION TO SUPPRESS

A(2)(ii)

No Reasonable Grammatical Interpretation of I.C. § 49-808(2)
Results In The State's Proffered Interoretation Of The Statute.

Without giving any consideration to clear and unambiguous language of the
Statute as discussed above, the State argues such things as "everyone who has ever driven
on a controlled-access highway would know that flying down the road requires a signal
of at least jive seconds." The State focuses its argument on possible absurd results by
applying a misinterpretation of the plain language meaning of the Statue without
considering the only rational clear and unambiguous meaning of the Statute: The signal

on a controlled access highway in all instances other than when turning from a parked
position shall be given continuously for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet
traveled by the vehicle before turning.
After ignoring the proper grammatical interpretation, the State

the

following interpretation of I.C. § 49-808(2): A driver must signal for five (5) seconds
when turning from any parke~ position and when changing lanes (turning) on a
controlled access highway. In all other instances, a drive must signal for one hundred
( 100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.
The State then makes the leap to legislative intent in order support its explanation.
Highlighting both the need for "reasonable safety" and the necessity for giving "an
appropriate signal," they buttress their argument with statements from the Idaho Driver's
Manual. The Driver's Manual, while instructive on due caution, was written with
different language than the Statute (freeways or highways versus controlled access
highway); it is not instructive on law. If the State's proffered interpretation were to be
adopted, it would directly conflict with the language of the Idaho Driver's Manual. For
example, the State wants the Court to adopt a requirement that on all non-controlled
access highways, a driver only has to signal for one hundred (100) feet traveled by the
vehicle before turning. The Idaho Driver's Manual would require that on any freeway or
highway, a driver signal for five (5) seconds.
This inherent ambiguity is not explained by the State; the State fails to explain
why its proffered interpretation conflicts with that of the Idaho Driver's Manual. The
State's explanation speaks for itself, it is the wrong explanation.

RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO MOTION TO SUPPRESS

3.

Access Highway.
There is only one reasonable result that gives effect to the plain language meaning
of the Statue: The signal on a controlled access highway in all instances other than when
turning from a parked position shall be given continuously for not less than the last one
hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. While the State argues that this
result stretches reason, that this result does not afford enough time to change lanes safely,
etc ... It does not change the fact that the Legislature deemed one hundred (100) feet an
acceptable distance for a signal on a controlled access highway. The State fails to explain
why their proffered interpretation completely ignores the rules of grammatical
interpretation/structure. Given the fact that the State was unable to do so, it is reasonable
to say that a person of ordinary intelligence cannot understand the plain, obvious and
rational meaning of this Statute.
In this case, there are only two conclusions; either, Officer Higley did not have

probable cause to stop Mr. Brooks or this Statute, as written, is void-for-vagueness.
Either result requires that all evidence obtained as a result of this stop be suppressed.

DATED Monday, September 17, 2012
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CERTIFICATE OF
I hereby certify that on Monday, September 17, 2012, I served a true and correct
the within Response to Objection to Motion to Suppress upon the individual(s) names
below in the manner noted:

IZl

By placing such a copy in the Prosecutor's basket located in the Clerk's office on the
second floor of the Canyon County Courthouse.
Canyon County Prosecutor
1115 Albany St.
Caldwell, ID 83605

Jim~ann

Attorney for the Defendant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PRESIDING: THOMAS J. RYAN DATE: SEPTEMBER 18, 2012

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

COURT MINUTE

)
)
)

CASE NO: CR2012-12437-C
CR2012-12215-C

)

)
vs.

)
)

TIME: 1:30 P.M.

MATTHEW 0. BROOKS,

)
)
)

DCRT4 (312-317)

Defendant.

REPORTED BY: Kim Saunders

This having been the time heretofore set for pre-trial in the above entitled
matters, the State was represented by Mr. Josh Taylor, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for
Canyon County, Idaho; and the defendant was not present in court and represented by
Mr. Jim Goldmann.
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Goldmann confirmed he was now handling
these cases.
The Court advised counsel it had signed an order allowing the defendant to
appear telephonically and inquired vvhether the defendant's presence was required.
Mr. Goldmann was unsure.
The Court indicated it had received a reply brief on the pending motion to
suppress which it had not adequately reviewed.

COURT MINUTE
SEPTEMBER 18, 2012

The Court noted trial was set for the 25th day of September, 2012 and speedy
was the 20th day of November, 2012. The Court proposed vacating that trial date and
re-setting the matter for the 15th day of October, 2012 before Judge Morfitt with a
continued pre-trial conference, where the defendant could appear te!ephonically, on the
1st day of October, 2012 at 2: 15 p.m. That would allow time for the Court to consider

the new briefing and render a decision on the motion to suppress.
Mr. Goldmann was in agreement.
Mr. Taylor objected as he had four (4) other cases set for trial that day and there
was a good possibility this case would proceed to trial.
In answer to the Court's inquiry, both of counsel indicated they could be prepared
to proceed on the 25th if the Court had the decision on the motion to suppress filing
tomorrow at 5:00 p.m.
The Court indicated it would contact the parties via telephonic conference if it
was unable to render a decision by 5:00 p.m. tomorrow, otherwise the trial was to
remain as set.

COURT MINUTE
SEPTEMBER 18, 2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF CANYON

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
vs.

MATTHEW 0. BROOKS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
) CASE NO. CR 2012-012437*C
)
CR 2012-012215*C
)
MEMORANDUM DECISION
)
UPON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
)
)
)
)
)
)

This matter came on for hearing on August 16, 2012 upon Defendant's motion to suppress.
Appearing on behalf of the defendant was his counsel, Lary Sisson. Appearing on behalf of the
State of Idaho was Canyon County deputy prosecuting attorney, Josh Taylor. Counsel was allowed
fourteen (14) days to supplement their briefing. On August 29, 2012, the Defendant filed his
Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress. On September 4, 2012, the State filed
supplemental Objection. On September 17, 2012, Defense filed its Response to State's Objection to
Motion to Suppress. Although both the State's brief and the defendant's response thereto were filed
after the deadline set, this Court has considered all of the briefing and the legal argument presented
at the suppression hearing, and hereby renders its decision below.

SUMMARY OF MOTION
Defendant seeks an order from the Court to suppress all physical evidence, testimony, lab
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reports, photos, documents, and statements made by the defendant which were obtained by the
State as a result of an unlawful seizure and search of the Defendant and the Defendant's vehicle.
Trooper Blake Higley initiated a traffic stop of the Defendant on Interstate

84

near Caldwell, Idaho. The Defendant initially drew the attention of Trooper Higley because he
was driving at a speed of sixty (60) mph in a seventy-five (75) mph zone. Higley then observed
the Defendant change lanes from the left lane to the right without signaling the tum for the
requisite five (5) seconds as required by statute. LC. §49-808(2). According to the Officer, the
Defendant signaled for approximately two seconds. 1 At that point, Trooper Higley initiated the
stop.
Trooper Higley approached the vehicle on the passenger side and made contact with the
Defendant. He observed a pack of cigarettes sitting on the front passenger seat and testified that
he also saw a small plastic bag containing what he believed to be methamphetamine sticking out
of the cigarette pack. Additionally, Trooper Higley testified that he could smell the odor of
marijuana and observed a small metal cone that he "knew" from his training was part of a pipe
used to smoke marijuana. At this point, Trooper Higley reached into the vehicle and. seized the
cigarette pack that contained what he believed to be methamphetamine.
The Defendant was arrested and Trooper Higley conducted a search of the vehicle and
found a marijuana pipe. He also found two syringes with injection needles, a spoon, rubber
band, and baggies inside a suitcase located in the vehicle.

PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures. If a search or seizure is conducted without a warrant it is deemed to be
unreasonable unless the State meets the burden of demonstrating that the search or seizure fell
within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 842,
979 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1999); State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 302, 912 P.2d 664, 670
(Ct.App.1995).
Under the plain view doctrine, a warrantless seizure can be justified where two

1

Trooper Higley testified that a vehicle traveling at a speed of 55 mph will travel 80 feet per second. Thus, a
for two seconds travels
160 feet at 55
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requirements are met: (1) the officer must lmvfully make an

intrusion or

properly be in a position to observe a particular area; and (2) it must be
that the items observed are evidence of a crime or otherwise

to

V.

Hagedorn, 129 Idaho 155, 159, 922 P.2d 1081, 1085 (Ct.App.1996).
The Court finds that the facts of this case clearly establish that the second element of this
doctrine was met when the Trooper observed the plastic baggie containing a substance that he
believed to be methamphetamine.
The issue presented by the Defendant is that the Trooper did not lawfully make a traffic
stop putting at issue the first requirement of the plain view doctrine - was

stop valid so that

the officer was properly in a position to observe a particular area.

TRAFFIC STOP
A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and implicates
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v.

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979); State v. Atkinson,,
128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d, 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). Under the Fourth A.mendment, an
officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. United States v.

Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628 (1981); S:ate v. Rawlings,
121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d
645, 648 (Ct.App.1998).
Here, Trooper Higley testified that the Defendant failed to use his tum signal for the
requisite five (5) seconds as required under LC. §49-808(2). Defendant argues that under LC. §49808(2), the statute requires use of a tum signal for one hundred (100) feet.

LC.

provides:
A signal of intention to tum or move right or left when required shall
be given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access
highways and before turning from a parked position, the signal
shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and,
in all other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100)
feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.
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(Emphasis added)
Importantly, Defendant stipulates that Interstate Highway 84 is a controlled-access
highway. Defendant argues that the five (5) second requirement applies

in those situations

when a person is initiating a turn onto a controlled-access highway from a parked position.
Defendant focuses on a plain language argument and the use of the word "ai'1d" in the statute.
Defendant's assertion is that if the legislature meant for the statute to require use of a tum signal for
five (5) seconds when changing lanes on a controlled access highway, it would have used the word
"or." If the legislature had this intention the statute would read: "On controlled-access highways or
before turning from a parked position .... "
Defendant points out that no Idaho case law has addressed the issue as presented in this
case. Other cases have considered other subsections of the statute and are factually distinguishable.

See Burton v. State Dept. of Transp. 149 Idaho 746, 240 P.3d 933 (Ct.App.2010); See State v.
Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 991P.2d338 (CtApp. 1999).
Additionally, Defendant's supplemental brie(mg provides a review of the turn signal laws
throughout the United States. Defendant argues that other states like Louisiana, Kansas, Oklahoma,
and Wyoming have a similar statute to Idaho's statute requiring use of a tum signal before turning
for one hundred (100) feet. In the case of Utah the requirement is two (2) seconds. Defendant's
purview of other state statutes, while interesting, does not provide legal precedent for this Court.
Considering there is no case law on point, this Court must look to the plain la.11guage of the Idaho
statute.
The State reads the statute to require use of a tum signal for five (5) seconds in two
different situations: (1) when changing lanes on a controlled-access highway, and (2) when making
a tum from a parked situation. Further, the State provides a common sense argument based on
public safety. The legislature intended to protect the public in requiring drivers to use their turn
signals for five (5) seconds when driving at high speeds on a freeway. The State cites to the Idaho
Driver's Ma.11ual advising that "signals must st::irt at least 100 feet (i..11 business or residential areas)
or five seconds (on freeways or highways) before you turn or change lanes." Idaho Driver's
Manual, April 2011, Ch. 2 pg. 9.
As pointed out above, the Defendant argues that had the legislature intended the law to be as

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Page4

the State claims, it would have used the word "or" instead of"and"
Further, the Defendant argues that

the last sentence

statute is open to either interpretation

is therefore

unconstitutionally vague.

Ac~ALYSIS

A. Officer's good faith belief based on plain language of statute
Here, Trooper Higley was operating on the belief that drivers on Interstate Highway 84 are
required to use a turn signal for five (5) seconds before changing lanes. Indeed, this Court and other
district courts have interpreted the statute to so require. 2 That is, LC. §49-808(2) requires that on
controlled-access highways the signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds.
Defendant stipulates that he was driving on a controlled-access highway.

If Trooper Higley' s interpretation of the law and facts before him was incorrect it could be
considered a mistake of fact and/or a mistake oflaw.
In Fourth Amendment applications, the reasonableness of police conduct is
judged against an objective standard. State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 291, 900
'P .2d 196, 199 (1995). We examine whether "the facts available to the officer at
the moment of the seizure ... [would] 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief' that the action taken was appropriate." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22,
88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968). See also Illinois v. Rodriguez,
497 U.S. 177, 188, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2801, 111 L.Ed.2d 148, 161 (1990). This
standard allows room for some mistakes on the part of police officers, so long as
the mistakes are those of reasonable persons. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 1890-91 (1949). See also State v.
Buhler, 137 Idaho 685, 688, 52 P.3d 329, 332 (Ct.App.2002); State v. McCarthy,
133 Idaho 119, 124, 982 P.2d 954, 959 (Ct.App.1999); State v. Hawkins, 131
Idaho 396, 401, 958 P.2d 22, 27 (Ct.App.1998). "[I]n order to satisfy the
'reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally
demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by
agents of the government ... is not that they always be correct, but that they
always be reasonable." Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2800, 111
L.Ed.2d at 159. Subjective good faith on the part of the officer is not enough. As
the United States Supreme Court has explained, "If subjective good faith alone
were the test, the protections of the Fourth A1nendn1ent would evaporate, and the
people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the
discretion of the police." Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d
2

See State v. Roberto Diaz, CR 2012-8900*C; See State v. Michael Luka Jocolucci, CR 2012-800*C, CR 2012-
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at 906. The mistake must be one that would be made
a reasonable
acting on the facts known to the officer. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186, 110
2793, 2800, 111 L.Ed.2d at 159-60; Hawkins, 131 Idaho at 401,
8
In sum, a traffic stop will not violate the Fourth Amendment if
reasonably suspects a violation of traffic laws even if later investigation dispels
the suspicion.

State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302-03, 246 P.3d 673, 675-76 (Ct. App. 2010), review denied
(Jan. 24, 2011).
The Horton Court recognized that the line between a mistake of fact and a mistake oflaw
is not always easy to ascertain. Horton, 150 Idaho 303. In State v.

133 Idaho 119,

982 P.2d 954 (Ct.App.1999), the Court of Appeals found an officer's mistaken belief (the
location of a speed limit sign) to be a mistake of law. The Court discussed the split of authority
from other jurisdictions as to whether a mistake of law can be held to be reasonable.

In

A1cCarthy, the Court did not have to decide if a mistake of law is unreasonable per se because
the Court characterized the mistake as not objectively reasonable. Id. at 125.
Here, if

~rooper

Higley' s belief that Defendant was required to use his turn signal for

five (5) seconds turns out to be incorrect, his mistake would most likely be characterized as a
mistake of law. While some jurisdictions would find a mistake of law to be umeasonable per se,
other jurisdictions would look to the standard applicable to a mistake of fact and ask if the
mistake was objectively reasonable.

Since Idaho precedent has not established the standard

when considering a mistake of law, this Court will use the reasonableness standard. Trooper
Higley had a good faith belief that Defendant was required to use his tum signal for five (5)
seconds and considering the application of this statute by this Court and Judge Huskey, his
conduct was that of a reasonable person acting under the facts known at the time.
B. Constitutionality of Statute
This Court cannot find any legal precedent to support Defendant's assertion that the statute
is unconstitutionally vague on its face. In Burton v. State Dept. of Transp., supra, the Court of
Appeals did find the statute to be unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts in that case.
However, the facts of that case are unrelated and therefore inapplicable in this case.
Defendant's response brief provides a persuasive argument in favor of its claim that the
statute requires a signal for not less than one hundred (100) feet before turning on a controlled

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Page 6

access highway. This argument is based on a grammatical interpretation

the

dissects the statute word by word, names the grammatical parts of the sentence, and adds language
the legislature did not include. Importai.1tly, this Court is not to an1end statutes as
legislature. Our Appellate Court recognizes "it is not the province of the Court to change

the
plain

meaning of the words used by the legislature." Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 664, 168 P .4d 40,
48 (Ct.App.2007); See State v. Holden, 126 Idaho 755, 761, 890 P.2d 341, 347 (Ct.App.1995); See
Barnes v. Hinton, 103 Idaho 619, 620, 651P.2d553, 554 (Ct.App.1982). A court may not legislate

nor by statutory construction change the words of the statute to include other conduct. Id; citing In
re Dampier, 46 Idaho 195, 206, 267 P. 452, 455 (1928).

Finally, Defendant's argument that a person of ordinary intelligence cannot understand the
plain meaning of the statute is unpersuasive. This Court looks to the common sense reading of the
statute, the Idaho Driver's Manual, and the legislature's interest in protecting public safety. This
Court is persuaded by the public safety argument that the legislature intended drivers on the freeway
to use turn signals for longer periods of tin1e. It makes sense that the legislature would require
drivers operating on our freeways at higher speeds to signal for longer than drivers

all other

instances." While not a statement of the law, the Idaho Driver's Manual does provide notice of the
requirement to use a tum signal for five (5) seconds on controlled-access highways. 3
Therefore,
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED.

District Judge

3

This Court

that the Defendant is a licensed Idaho state
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused the foregoing to be served upon the
postage prepaid, facsimile transmission or by hand delivery:

BRYAN.F. TAYLOR
JOSH TAYLOR
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORl"''EY
1115 Albany St.
Caldwell, ID 83605

MARKMIMURA
LARY SISSON
CANYON COUNTY PlJBLIC DEFENDER
510 Arthur St.
Caldwell, ID 83605

q\\9\l2 '
Da~e
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jbt
TAYLOR
COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 454-7391

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

THE STATE OF IDAHO
CASE NO. CR2012-12437
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME
~OR HEARING Al~D
OF HEARING

vs.
MATTHEW 0 BROOKS,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, JOSHUA B. TAYLOR, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

the

Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, State of Idaho, and hereby moves this Court for
an Order to Shorten Time for a Motion to Continue the Jury Trial to be heard. That the
necessary prior to the t1ial date of September, 25th, 2012 and that the delay in filing was cause
by expert witness unavailability and need to notify defense of the state's motion because their
client is travelling here from Oregon.

1

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME
AND NOTICE OF HEARING

is

NOTICE OF HEARING
Notice is hereby given that a hearing on the Motion

in the above entitled matter is

scheduled for the 24th day of September, 2012, at the hour of9a.m., before the Honorable James
C. Morfitt.
DATED this

n·i-\~
.1

--w--~---11

day of September, 2012.

Deput

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

()(~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on or about this ~
day of September, 2012,
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the attorney for
the defendant by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:
() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
() Hand Delivered
(X) Placed in Court Basket
() Overnight Mail
() Facsimile
(x) E-Mail

Canyon County Public Defender

2

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME
AND NOTICE OF HEARING

BRYAN F. TAYLOR
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 454-7391

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

THE STATE OF IDAHO
CASE NO. CR2012-12437
Plaintiff,
MOTION TO CONTINUE
JURY TRIAL AND ,
NOTICE OF HEARING

VS.

MATTHEW 0 BROOKS,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, JOSHUA B. TAYLOR, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney of the Canyon
County Prosecuting Attorney's Office and hereby moves this Court for an Order vacating the
Jury Trial herein and resetting the same for any time after October 1, 2012, for the reason that the
state's witness will be unavailable for said Jury Trial on September, 25th, 2012.

NOTICE OF HEARING
Notice is hereby given that a hearing on the Motion filed in the above entitled matter is
scheduled for the 24th day of September, 2012, at the hour of 9 a.m., before the Honorable Judge
Morfitt.

MOTION TO CONTINUE

1

CERTIFICATE OF S~RVIC:+-

;l-l

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on or about this
day
September, 2012,
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the attorney for
the defendant by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:
() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
() Hand Delivered
(X) Placed in Court Basket
() Overnight Mail
() Facsimile
(x) E-Mail

Canyon County Public Defender

MOTION TO CONTINUE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PRESIDING: JAMES C. MORFITT
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

MATIHEW 0. BROOKS,

COURT MINUTE

)

CASE NO. CR-2012-12437*C
CR-2012-1221 S*C

)
)

TIME: 9:00 A.M.

)

-vs-

DATE: SEPTEMBER 24, 2012

)
Defendant.

)
)

REPORTED BY: Carole Bull

DCRT 4 (912-920)
This having been the time heretofore set for hearing on the State's Motion to
Shorten Time and Motion to Continue Jury Trial in the above entitled matters, the
State was represented by Mr. Josh Taylor, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon
County, and the defendant did not appear, but was represented by counsel, Mr. Lary
Sisson.
Mr. Sisson advised the Court the defendant lived outside of Oregon and the
Court had previously allowed him to appear telephonically at previous hearings.
However, Mr. Sisson noted that his office had been unable to contact the defendant
regarding today's hearing and that he did not have authorization to proceed without his
presence.
Mr. Taylor advised the Court the basis of the State's motion to continue trial was
that the defendant's witness would be unavailable on September 25, 2012.

COURT MINUTES
SEPTEMBER 24, 2012

The Court noted it had received the State's motions, but that there was no
supporting affidavit of which witness would not be available and why.
Mr. Sisson clarified he did not have the defendant's authority to proceed in his
absence on these matters.
The Court advised counsel it would pass the matter and allow Mr. Sisson an
opportunity to contact the defendant to see if the matter could be taken up later on the
morning calendar.
The Court addressed with counsel the infraction offenses that were charged in
the companion case (CR2012-12215*C); and all parties agreed those matters should be
severed from the felony case.

The Court noted it would address the issue of the

infraction offenses when it addressed the Motion to Shorten Time and Motion to
Continue later today.
The Court passed the matter at 9:20 a.m.
Later this date at 11 :40 a.m., the clerk was advised that this matter would not be
addressed again on today's date, but rather continued to the trial set for tomorrow,
September 25, 2012 at 9:00 a.m., at which time the Court would address the pending
motions.

COURT MINUTES

SEPTEMBER 24, 2012

2

IN THE DISTRICT COU

THE THIRD JUCICIAL DISTRICT

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PRESIDING: JAMES C. MORFITT DATE: SEPTEMBER 25, 2012

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)

COURT MINUTES

)

Plaintiff,

vs
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS,

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR-2012-12437*C
221 S*C
CR-201
TIME 9:00 A.M.
REPORTED BY: Debora Kreidler

)

Defendant.

)

DCRT 4 (911-918)

This having been the time heretofore set for Jury Trial in the above entitled
matters, the State was represented by Mr. Josh Taylor, Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys
for Canyon County, Idaho, and the defendant was not present, however was
represented by counsel, Mr. Jim Goldmann.
The Court called the cases, noted the parties present and inquired.
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Goldmann advised that he was not privately
retained in this case.
The Court noted that these cases were set for jury trial to commence on this
date, reviewed the status conference heard the previous date and noted that the
defendant had failed to appear for both hearings.

Further, the Court reviewed the

State's Motion to Continue and reviewed the issue of the infractions filed in the
consolidated misdemeanor case.

COURT MINUTES
SEPTEMBER 25, 2012

Mr. Goldmann advised the Court that the defendant was not

advised

that he had spoken with the defendant on the 1sth of September and advised that the
defendant had stated it would be difficult for him to be present. Further, Mr. Goldmann
advised that he had not heard further from the defendant, advised that he had an
incorrect address for the defendant and advised that Mr. Sisson had tried to call the
defendant three (3) times on the previous date.
The Court noted the defendant resided in Oregon.
Mr. Goldmann concurred.
The Court noted the defendant had previously posted bond and inquired.
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Taylor requested the Court issue a bench
warrant in these matters, advised that he would request a lower bond if the defendant
resided in the area, however with the defendant residing in Oregon, he would request a
higher bond to allow the defendant to be extradited if the defendant were arrested.
Further, Mr. Taylor presented statements regarding the State not being prepared to
proceed to jury trial on this date.
The Court noted the defendant's previous bond was set in the amount of
$25,000.00.
Mr. Taylor requested a total bond in the amount of $50,000.00.
Mr. Goldmann advised that he believed the defendant would be traveling to
Idaho sometime due to the defendant's children residing in Idaho.
The Court expressed opinions regarding the defendant not being present,
reviewed previous proceedings and noted the defendant had notice of the hearings.
COURT MINUTES
SEPTEMBER 25, 2012

2

Further, the Court noted the defendant had previously entered a not guilty plea and had
demanded speedy trial.
The Court forfeited any bond set in these matters and issued a bench warrant
due to the defendant's failure to appear in the amount of $50,000.00.

The Court noted that in CR-2012-12215*C, there were three infractions filed.
Further, the Court advised that according to Idaho Infraction Rule 3, it did not believe
the infractions could be consolidated into the same case as a felony that was set for jury
trial.
Mr. Taylor reviewed the previous hearing regarding the infractions, requested the
infractions be remanded to magistrate court and noted that the infractions did not carry
jail time.
Mr. Goldmann advised that he had nothing further to add regarding the
infractions.
The Court advised that it was not appropriate under Idaho Infraction Rule 3 to
have infractions consolidated with a misdemeanor and a felony,

7 "'"''r"" 1~n

ordered the three (3} infractions in CR-2012-12215*C severed, remanded
infractions to the clerk to magistrate court and advised that

not entitled to the assistance of a public defender on the

defendant was
cases since

they did not carry jail time.

The Court directed Mr. Goldmann to advice the defendant of the severed
infractions.

COURT MINUTES
SEPTEMBER 25, 2012

3

The Court adjourned at 9:18 a.m.

Deputy Clerk

CCURT MINUTES
SEPTEMBER 25, 2012
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CANYON COUNTY

DEFEI\1DER

Lary G. Sisson
510 Arthur Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Phone: (208) 639-4585
Fax: (208) 639-4611
Idaho State Bar No. 6072

KGQfitDILLO, DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL

OF

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF CANYON
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff

CASE NO. CR-2012-12437-C
CR-2012-12215-C

MOTION
APPEAL

vs.
MATTHE\V BROOKS,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, MATTHEW BROOKS,

and

through his attorney of record, the Canyon County Public Defender's Office, and hereby
moves this Honorable Court for Permission to Appeal the Court's denial of Defendant's
Motion to Suppress in the above-listed matters.
This Motion is based on the following:
1. On June 29, 2102, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress in these matters.
2. On August 16, 2012, a hearing was held on the Motion to Suppress.
3. On September 19, 2012, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision deny
Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

MOTION FOR PE&.\1ISSION TO APPEAL

4. Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Idaho Appellate Rules permission may be granted
by the Supreme Court to appeal from an interlocutory

or judgment

a

district court in a criminal action, which:
A.

is not otherwise appealable under the Appellate rules, but

B.

involves a controlling question of law and

C.

there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion, and

D.

an immediate appeal from the order or decree may materially
advance the orderly resolution of the litigation.

5. The interlocutory order denying Defendant's motion to suppress meets all the
criteria listed above.
6. In addition, since Defend ant failed to appear for his trial, permission to appeal
may be an appropriate use of time until Defendant actually appears in Idaho
for a trial.
Defendant reserves the right to supplement this Motion with additional
arguments, documents and evidence.

NOTICE OF HEARING
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that attorney for Defendant will bring up for
hearing the above Motion at the Canyon County District Courthouse, 1115 Albany Street,
Caldwell, Idaho, on the 10th day of October, 2012, at the hour of 10:30 a.m. or as soon
thereafter as can be heard before the Honorable Thomas J. Ryan.
DATED this_ day of September, 2012.

LARY G. SISSON
Assistant Public Defender
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL

OF SERVICE
hereby certify that on
_ _ day of September, 2012, I served a true and conect copy
the within and foregoing document upon the individual(s) named below in the rnallirier noted:
/J/

[Q'B y delivering copies of the same to the courthouse box of the attomey(s) indicated below.
Canyon County Prosecutor's Office
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

Assistant Public Defender

.\10TION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL
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MARQ.MIMURA

CANYON COlJNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

Lary G. Sisson
510 Arthur Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Phone: (208) 639-4585
Fax: (208) 639-4611
Idaho State Bar No. 6072

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL

OF

STATE OF IDAHO, IN Ac~D FOR THE COlJNTY OF CANYON
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
CASE NO. CR-2012-12437-C
CR-2012-1
5-C

Plaintiff

MOTION TO RECONSIDER
ORDER DENYING 1\!IOTION
SUPPRESS

vs.
MATTHEW BROOKS,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, MATTHEW BROOKS, by and
through his attorney of record, the Canyon County Public Defender's Office, and hereby
moves this Honorable Court to reconsider its Order to Denying Defendant's Motion to
Suppress in the above-listed matters.
This Motion is based on the following:
1. The Court considered that the officer may have made a mistake of law when
interpreting the meaning and application of Idaho Code, Section 49-808(2).
2. Since the Court concluded that there is not a standard of review for a mistake
of law in Idaho, then the Court determined that it would use a "reasonableness
standard".

MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER
DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS

1

3. However, Defendant argues that the Court should follow the precedents
A.

The Idaho Supreme Court as set forth

State v. Guzman,

Idaho 981 (1992); and
B.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals as set forth in U

v. Lopez-

Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2000) and U.S. v. King, 244 F.3d
736 (9th Cir. 2001)
4. In State v. Guzman, the Idaho Supreme Court unequivocally rejected the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule based on Article I, Section 17 of the
Idaho Constitution.
5. Part of the decision in U.S. v. Lopez-Soto states: We have no doubt that
Officer Hill [the investigating officer] held his mistaken view of the law in
good faith, but there is no good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for
police who do not act in accordance with governing law. See United States v.
Gantt, 194 F.3d 987, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). To create an exception here would
defeat the purpose of the exclusionary rule, for it would remove the incentive
for police to make certain that they properly understand the law that they are
entrusted to enforce and obey. We therefore hold that Officer Hill violated the
Fourth Amendment when he stopped Lopez-Soto, and that the evidence
gathered as a result of the unconstitutional stop must be suppressed. See Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963)."
6. The final decision in U.S. v. King states: "Although Allen [the investigating
officer] acted reasonably and his interpretation of the traffic law was
reasonable, he was nonetheless mistaken in his belief that King's conduct

MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER
DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS

2

violated the law. Because an officer's mistake of law cannot

the

for

reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop, we reverse the
denial of King's motion to suppress."
7. The Idaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Guzman is binding on the
Court.
8. Because Idaho falls within the federal jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, the decisions in U.S. v. Lopez-Soto and U.S. v. King should be
highly persuasive to the Court.
9. Additionally, the Court determined that Idaho Code, Section 49-808(2) is not
unconstitutionally vague.
10. However, the Court does not clearly, unambiguously and specifically provide
an interpretation of the statute.
11. More specifically, the court does not interpret how the phrase, "before turning
from a parked position" relates to the phrase, "On controlled-access
highways" - if it relates at all. These two phrases are connected to one
another with the conjunction "and".
12. Idaho case law is clear that a statute must be construed so that effect is given

to every word and clause of a statute. State v. Baer, 132 Idaho 416, 417-18,
973 P.2d 768, 769-70 (Ct.App.1999) (emphasis added).
13. Furthermore, the Court asserts that in Defendant's response brief, the
Defendant "adds language [to the statute] that the legislature

not include."

However, the Court does not specify which words the Defendant presumably
attempts to add to the statute.

MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER
DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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statute, the Idaho Driver's Manual, and the legislature's
public safety. This Court is persuaded by the public safety argument that the
legislature intended drivers on the freeway to use tum signals for longer
periods of time. It makes sense that the legislature would require drivers
operating on our freeways at higher speeds to signal for longer than drivers 'in
all other instances.'"
15. As strange as this may sound, "common sense" is not the standard for
interpreting statutes. When interpreting the meaning of language contained in
a statute, a court must interpret the statute in order to give effect to the

legislature's intent and purpose. State v. Coleman, 128 Idaho 466, 469, 915
P.2d 28, 31 (Ct.App.1996) (emphasis added). Besides, the famous French
philosopher, Voltaire, correctly observed that "Common sense is not so
common."
16. The Idaho Driver's Manual is not a legal opinion or decision. It is certainly
not persuasive because the actual writer of the manual, and his/her
qualifications and/or ability to interpret Idaho statutes, is also unknown.
17. In addition, the record is absent of any evidence or identifiable and reliable
information that suggests that "the legislature intended drivers on the freeway
to use tum signals for longer periods of time." In other words, in its decision
the Court did not provide any legislative history materials supporting the
assertion that the legislature intended for drivers to use tum signals for longer
periods while driving on freeways.

MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER
DENYL~G MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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18. It should be noted that the language for using a signal for five seconds was
placed in the original statue (which was then 49-664) back in 1950s - at a
time when superhighways, freeways, and large-scale interstate highways did
not exist. The modern interstate freeway system was first initiated by the
Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956.
Defendant reserves the right to supplement this Motion with additional
arguments, documents and evidence.
NOTICE OF HEARING
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that attorney for Defendant will bring up for
hearing the above Motion at the Canyon County District Courthouse, 1115 Albany Street,
Caldwell, Idaho, on the 10th day of October, 2012, at the hour of 10:30 a.m. or as soon

//3

thereafter as can be heard before the Honorable Thomas J. R 'an.

01:+-

DATED thisiL..J_ day of September, 2012
I

/

)

/lA

UL ;.J-

/

~

():.ARY G.1 SISSON
Assistant Public Defender

MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER
DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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I hereby certify that on the of..
_ _ day of September, 2012, I served a true
correct copy of
the within and foregoing document upon the individual(s) named belovv in the manner

~delivering copies of the same to the courthouse box of the attorney(s) indicated
Canyon County Prosecutor's Office
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

Assistant Public Defender
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sz
BRYAN F. TAYLOR
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORi'\JEY
Canyon CouI1ty Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 454-7391

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

THE STATE OF IDAHO
CASE NO. CR2012-12437
Plaintiff,
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER
DENYING lVIOTION TO SUPPRESS AND
LEAVE FOR MOTION TO APPEAL

vs.
MATTHEW 0 BROOKS,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, JOSHUA B. TAYLOR, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney of the
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, on behalf of the State ofldaho, who objects to
the Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to Suppress and Leave for Motion to
Appeal filed by the above named Defendant herein.
Further the State rests on its previous briefing of the issue and
previous ruling on the recordG} ~···
DATED this

l

day of October, 2012.

JOSHUA
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER
DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS
LEA VE FOR MOTION TO APPEAL 1

Court's

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on or about this
day
October, 2012, I
served upon the attorney for the
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to
defendant by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:
Canyon County Public Defender

() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
() Hand Delivered
(X) Placed in Court Basket
() Overnight Mail
() Facsimile
() E-Mail

Depu y Prosecuting Attorney

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER
DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS
AND LEAVE FOR MOTION TO APPEAL 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PRESIDING: THOMAS J. RYAN DATE: OCTOBER 1

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

2012

)
)

COURT MINUTE

)
)

CASE NO: CR 2012-12437*C
CR 2012-12215*C

)

vs.
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

TIME: 10:30 A.M.
DCRT4 (1050-1056)
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders

This having been the time heretofore set for motion hearing in the above
entitled matter, the State was represented by, Mr. Casey Hemmer, Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney for Canyon County, Idaho; and the defendant was not present in court, but was
represented by counsel, Mr. Lary Sisson.
The Court noted the case and indicated there had been two motions filed; a
motion to reconsider the ruling on the motion to suppress and a motion for permission to
appeal.
The Court further noted the case had been set for Jury Trial; however, the
defendant had failed to appear and therefore, a warrant had been issued and remained

COURT MINUTE
OCTOBER 10, 2012

outstanding. Based on the defendant's failure to appear, the Court suggested the
motions be addressed after the defendant was taken into custody on the warrant.
Mr. Sisson advised the Court that the defendant resides in Oregon and he was
not able to provide the Court with any assurance that he will return to Idaho. He had
spoken with the defendant the day the warrant was issued at which time the defendant
indicated that he was not satisfied with the representation he was receiving.
The Court inquired if the defendant was intentionally not entering the State of
Idaho to avoid arrest.
Mr. Sisson indicated that he didn't believe he was qualified to answer to Courts
question.
The Court indicated that it didn't believe the Motion for Permission to Appeal
should be addressed until the Motion to Reconsider had been decided. If the Court
denied the Motion to Reconsider the foundation would be laid for the Motion for
Permission to Appeal.
Mr. Sisson advised the Court that he believed the Motion to Reconsider spoke for
itself and there was nothing more he wished to add. As for the Motion for Permission to
Appeal, he had filed said motion to be within the time line requirements. However, if the
Court wished to take that motion up at a later time, he would have no objection.
The Court indicated that the time line with regard to the Motion for Permission to
Appeal would not begin until a ruling had been made on the Motion to Reconsider.

COURT MINUTE
OCTOBER 10, 2012

2

In answer to the Courts inquiry, Mr. Hemmer indicated that Mr. Taylor had filed
an objection to the Motion for Reconsideration in which he indicated he would submit on
the briefing previously filed on the Motion to Suppress.
Mr. Hemmer further noted his concern regarding the defendants' failure to return
to the State of Idaho and didn't believe it was the best use of judicial resources to
address these matters now while a warrant was outstanding.
The Court noted Mr. Hemmers concerns and advised each of counsel that it
would take the Motion to Reconsider under advisement. It would issue a ruling on the
matter and depending on said ruling the Motion for Permission to Appeal could be
addressed.

Deputy Clerk

COURT MINUTE
OCTOBER 10, 2012
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
vs.

MATTHEW 0. BROOKS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
) CASE NO. CR 2012-012437*C
)
CR 2012-012215*C
)
ORDER DENYING MOTION
)
TO RECONSIDER
)
)
)
)
)
)

This matter came on for hearing on October 10, 2012, upon Defendant's

to

Reconsider Order Denying Motion to Suppress, filed on September 27, 2012. Appearing on behalf
of the defendant was his counsel, Lary Sisson. Appearing on behalf of the State of Idaho was
Canyon County deputy prosecuting attorney, Casey Hemmer. The State filed its objection on
October 10, 2012. Both parties rested on their previous briefing filed with the Comi and oral
arguments on the Motion to Suppress. The Court has considered tl-}ese and hereby finds as follows.

SUMMARY OF MOTION
Defendant's main argument is that the Court should have applied State v. Guzman, 122
Idaho 981 (1992) and two Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals cases, US. v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d
1101 (91h Cir. 2000) and US. v. King, 244 F.3d 736 (9th Circ. 2001 ). In State v. Guzman, the
Idaho Supreme Court discussed the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, as announced

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER
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by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468
677 (1984).

.S. 897, 04 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d

In United States v. Leon, the Court decided to

insufficiency of the affidavit in support of the warrant. The Idaho State

despite the
Court adopted

the Leon good faith exception in State v. Prestvvich, 116 Idaho 959, 783 P.2d 298 (1989).
Ultimately, the Guzman Court rejected the good faith exception as it relates to the warrant
process on state constitutional grounds.
ANALYSIS
The only legal issue in dispute is the application of I.C. §49-808(2), which provides:
A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall
be given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access
highways and before turning from a parked position, the signal
shall be given continuously for not less than
(5) seconds and,
in all other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100)
feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.
(Emphasis added).
I

The Court sununarizes the arguments as follows. The Defense position is that Defendant
was only required to use his tum signal for one hundred ( 100) feet, which he did; therefore, the stop
was invalid and the evidence must be suppressed. The State's position is that Defendant was
required to use his tum signal for five (5) seconds, which he failed to do; therefore, the stop was
valid and the evidence is admissible.
The question before this Court on the Motion to Suppress asked for an interpretation of I.C.
§49-808(2). In its decision this Court said, "Here, Trooper Higley was operating on the belief that
drivers on Interstate High way 84 are required to use a tum signal for five (5) seconds before
changing lanes.

Indeed, this Court and other district courts have interpreted the statute to so

require. 1 That is, I.C. §49-808(2) requires that on controlled-access highways the signal shall be
given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds." In order to clarify, this Court reads the plain
language of I.C. §49-808(2) to require that drivers on controlled access highways must use their tum
signal continuously for five (5) seconds before moving right or left.
In its Memorandum Decision, this Court discussed Trooper Higley's good faith belief t..11at
1

See State v. Roberto Diaz, CR

2012-8900*C~

See State v. lvfichaei Luka locolucci, CR 2012-800*C, CR 2012-719*C before the Honorable
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had violated I.C. §49-808(2) because he did not use his tum signal for five

Defense counsel uses this discussion to argue that the
established in State v. Guzman,

has not

seconds.
precedent

, v. Lopez-Soto, and U.S. v. King.

This Court's decision on its Memorandum Decision on Motion to Suppress is not at odds
with Guzman or the Ninth Circuit cases. Importantly, State v. Guzman addressed the good faith
exception as it relates to the sufficiency of a warrant. This is a crucial factual distinction with
this case. The Guzman Court discussed Article 1, §17 that "no warrant shall issue without
probable cause" along with the intention of the exclusionary rule.

"We believe that the

exclusionary rule should be applied in order to: 1) provide an effective remedy to persons who
have been subjected to an unreasonable government search and/or seizure; 2) deter the police
from acting unlawfully in obtaining evidence; 3) encourage thoroughness in the warrant issuing
process; 4) avoid having the judiciary commit an additional constitutional violation by
considering evidence which has been obtained through illegal means; and 5) preserve judicial
integrity." Guzman, 122 Idaho at 993. The sufficiency of a warrant is not at issue in this case.
I

Furthermore, the above-mentioned goals have been achieved. Because this Court finds that I.C.
§49-808(2) required Defendant to use his turn signal for five (5) seconds, the stop and
subsequent search (under the plain view exception as stipulated to by the parties) were
reasonable and Trooper Higley was acting lawfully.
The Ninth Circuit cases are also distinguishable. In US. v. Lopez-Soto, the Court said
that the Officer was in error and had incorrectly interpreted the statute at issue. The Court said,
"Officer Hill stopped Lopez-Soto because he had been instructed that the absence of a vehicle
registration sticker from the rear provided a reasonable basis for suspicion of a Baja California
code violation. That police academy training, however, was in error. In fact, the applicable Baja
California code section directs that the sticker be displayed on the windshield." U.S. v. Lopez-

Soto, 205F.3d at 1104. Again, determining that the officer was mistaken as to the law, the US.

v. King Court found that the defendant had not violated the law. The Court said that the officer
was mistaken that driving with a parking placard hanging from the rearview mirror violated the
traffic ordinance.

The Court went through a plain language interpretation of the statute,

Anchorage Municipal Code §9.36.040(D), to show that the code prohibited such a parking
on the windshield, but not the review mirror. US. v.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER
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While this Court's Memorandum Decision did discuss a hypothetical scenario in which
Trooper Higley had made a mistake, Trooper Higley was not mistaken.

interpreted

law; I.C. §49-808(2) requires drivers on controlled-access highways to use their tum signal
for five (5) seconds.

Only if an Appellate Court determines that I.C. §49-808(2) requires

otherwise would the discussion of a mistake of fact or mistake of law apply. But this discussion
is merely dictum.
Defendant raises other issues in his Motion to Reconsider but because of the Court's
plain language interpretation of the statute, those points become moot.
Therefore,

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Order Denying
Motion to Suppress is DENIED.

'2012.

District Judge
Thomas J. Ryan
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I hereby ce11ify that I caused the foregoing to be served upon the following via
postage prepaid, facsimile transmission or by hand delivery:

u

Mail,

BRYAN F. TAYLOR
JOSH TAYLOR

CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORL"'JEY
1115 Albany St.
Caldwell, ID 83605

MARKMIMURA
LARY SISSON

CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
510 Arthur St.
Caldwell, ID 83605

\t

\\It

Date/

\r
)

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN Al'\TD FOR THE COUNTY OF

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
vs.

MATTHEWO. BROOKS,
Defendant.

C"u~YON

)
)
)

) CASE NO. CR 2012-012437*C
CR2012-012215*C
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL

The above-captioned case was set for a Jury Trial on September 25, 2012 at which time the
Defendant failed to appear and a bench warrant was issued with bond set in the amount of
$50,000.00. On September 27, 2012, Defendant filed a Motion for Permission to Appeal and a
Motion to Reconsider Order Denying Motion to Suppress. These motions came on for hearing on
October 10, 2012. Jv1r. Casey Hemmer, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney appeared on behalf of the
State, and Mr. Lary Sisson appeared on behalf of the Defendant. The Court took the

to

Reconsider under advisement and notified counsel that in the event the Court denied the Motion to
Reconsider, the Motion for Permission to Appeal could be addressed if it was renewed by counsel.
On October 16, 2012, the Court issued its Order Denying Motion to Reconsider. The defense has
not requested a hearing upon the Motion for Pemlission to Appeal. Further, the Court has reviewed
the motion and the law applicable thereto and finds that oral argument is unnecessary.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL
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Al~ALYSIS

Idaho Appellate Rule 12 governs permissive appeal.

sets

permissive appeal. "Permission may be granted . . . to appeal from an interlocutory

of a

district court . . . which is not otherwise appealable under these rules, but which involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion ai1d ii1
which an immediate appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly ,.._,..,vH.,uvu
of the litigation." The Defendant seeks to appeal the Court's ruling on the

of suppression,

a11

interlocutory order. State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 29 P.3d 949 (2001).
Importantly, permissive appeal is only accepted "in the most exceptional cases, with the
intent to resolve 'substantial legal issues of great public interest or legal questions of first
impression."' Aardema v. US. Dairy Sys., 147 Idaho 785, 789, 215 P.3d 505, 509 (2009); citing
Budell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2, 4, 665 P.2d 70 I, 703 (1983) (per curiam). Also, the Court should

consider whether the resolution of the suppression issue would be "of
administration of the criminal justice system." State v. Bid71ell, 140 Idaho

importance in the
1, 203, 91 P.Jd

1105, 1107 (2004). This case was set for a jury trial, andr Defendant failed to appear. Defense
counsel argues that allowing pem1issive appeal would be a good use of

until Defendant

actually appears in Idaho for a trial. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive.
if the Court grants this motion and the appeal accepted by the appellate court,

instance,
the Defendant

is arrested shortly thereafter, he may be in jail a significant a.-nount of time while

appeal

progressed. It appears to this Court that it is best for the administration of the criminal justice
system in this case to allow it to proceed to trial following arrest of the Defendant

once the

case is adjudicated, an appeal can be taken if so desired by the Defendant.
Therefore,

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL
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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion

Dated this

Jrday of

Permission to

, I

Nu\IC:,iNi,,bt}v , 2012.
District Judge
Thomas J. Rya...11

j

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused the foregoing to be served upon the following via U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, facsimile transmission or by hand delivery:
I

BRYAi~F. TAYLOR
JOSH TAYLOR

CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORi~"EY
1115 Albany St.
Caldwell, ID 83605

MARKMIMURA
LARY SISSON
CAt'JYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
510 Arthur St.
Caldwell, ID 83605

Date/

Deputy Clerk
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!N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF !DAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

THE STATE OF !DAHO,
Plaintiff,
VS.

{l/!_. JIJ/:2. JJ.JU :f+t_
FELONY
NCH WARRANT
OF ARREST

Defendant.
______________
)

TO ,<\NY SHERIFF, COl\JSTABLE, MARSHAL, POLICEMEN, OR PEACE OFFlCER IN
THE STATE OF IDAHO:
The Court having this date entered it's Order for the issuance of a Bench VVarrant
for the arrest of the above named defendant for failure to appear in Court as heretofore
Ordered by this Court, and the defendant having previously been charged with

fl
.
VO$'')£SS:VSY1

')

'

/J .

of tl (;;n bolttti .dub> t {/1110

in violation of Idaho Code Section( s )-'~.._'._7..:,..)_1!-=3_:1_(_L_')_(__,__)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

a

felony.~ Posges~wnDP

Paraph!rflaLitL J7273ifA (1) ~ t's·d.

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED forthwith to arrest the above named
defendant and bring said defendant before the undersigned District Court Judge, or if
said Judge is unavailable, then before the nearest available Magistrate. This Warrant
may be served at any time during the hours of day or night.

BENCH WARP.ANT

[FELONY}

After considering the facts pertaining to the defendant
-::-

set in the amount of
Dated this

sol

,Y'f'
akJ7

0

the crime, the bail is

~

9 0 ---·-.

day of

S-<¢t1r;1 b-ef

'201~

District Ju~

Hair: J}vp}Ulll

Race: - - - - - Height

b D)
1

Weight:

/JO fJDunds
I

Eyes: -~llJlAJ()

oos:

SSN:
Agency: - - - - - · - - - -

RETURN
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Canyon

)
)

SS.

l HEREBY CERTIFY that l received this Warrant on

~-----------

and served the said Warrant by arresting the within named defendant
on - - - - - - - - - - - - (Name)

(Title)

BENCH WARRANT

[FELONY]

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF CANYON
[8J ARRAIGNMENT
[8J iN-CUSTODY
0 SENTENCING I CHANGE OF PLEA

CR-2012-12215-C

Case No.
Plaintiff
Date: 2/21 /2013

-vsMATTHEW BROOKS
Defendant.

0

Judge: SCHILLER

True Name
Corrected Name:

APPEARANCES:
0 Defendant
0 Defendant's Attorney

0

Recording: MAG 7 (140-143)

!8J Prosecutor Kimberlee Bratcher
0 Interpreter

0

FAILURE TO APPEAR: Defendant failed to appear. It is Ordered:
bench warrant issued
D bail on warrant $
bail forfeited
D referred to PA

D
D

ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS: Defendant
[8J was informed of the charges against him/her and all legal rights, including the right to be represented by
counsel.
[8J requested court appointed counsel.
0 waived right to counsel.
l'Z'.l lndigency hearing held.
['Z'.J Court appointed public defender.
D Court denied court-appointed counsel.

[8J District Court Arraignment:
BAIL:

March 1, 2013 at 9:00 am

before Judge Huskey

State recommends

D Released on written citation promise to appear
D Released on own recognizance (O.R.)
D Released to pre-trial release officer.
D No Contact Order D entered D continued
D Address Verified

D

Released on bond previously posted.

[8J Remanded to the custody of the sheriff.
[8J Bail set at $50,000 total continued
[8J Continued Consolidated

0

Corrected Address _ _

OTHER:

~~,Deputy

ARRAIGNMENT I FIRST APPEARANCE

Clerk

07/2009

FILED -----''H--'--~~t--
CLERK

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF CANYON

BY~-\:-~~~-.!:~~~~ff::l'qmcy

)

)

THE STATE OF IDAHO/or

)
)

)

ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC
DEFENDER

)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)
The Court being fully advised as to the application of the above-named applicant and it appearing to
be a proper case.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Canyon County Public Defender be. and hereby is. appointed for

·.~THE MATTER IS SET FOR

vr· )

In Custody -- Bond$
Released: D O.R.
D on bond previously posted
D to PreTriaf Release
Juvenile:

D

D
D

In Custody
Released to

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

No Contact Order entered.

iXi Cases consolidated.[C,O((Li{)
D

Discovery provided by State.

D

Interpreter required.

D

Additional charge of FTA.

Original--Court File

YeHow--Public Defender

Pink--Prosecuting Attorney

ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC

DEFENDER
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
I
1

PRESIDING: DENNIS E. GOFF DATE: MARCH 1, 2013

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

COURT MINUTES
CASE NO. CR2012-12437-C
CR2012-12215-C

Plaintiff,

vs

TIME: 9:00 A.M.

MATTHEW 0. BROOKS,

DCRT5 (1208-1210)

Defendant,

REPORTED BY: Laura Whiting

This having been the time heretofore set for arraignment in the above entitled
matters, the State was represented by Ms. Lisa Donnell, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
for Canyon County, and the defendant appeared in court with counsel, Mr. Lary Sisson.
The Court called the case and noted a motion for an interlocutory appeal had
been denied as well as a motion to reconsider, therefore, this matter

to

set

for a jury trial.

The Court set this matter for jury trial commencing on the 23rd day of
2013 at 8:30 a.m. before Judge Morfitt.
The defendant was instructed to remain in contact with his attorney and was
remanded into the custody of the Canyon County Sheriff pending further proceeding or
posting of bond.

COURT MINUTES
MARCH 1, 2013
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Robyn Fyffe, ISB #7063
BENJAMIN,
303
Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: 208-343-1000
Facsimile: 208-345-8274
Email: rfyffe@nbmlaw.com

LLP

&

Attorneys for Two Jinn, Inc. dba Aladdin Bail Bonds/Anytime Bail Bonds
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAN"YON
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff,)
vs.
MATTHEW 0 BROOKS,

)
)
)
)

)
Defendant,)
)
)
)
ALADDIN BAIL BONDS as agent for
DANIELSON NATIONAL INSURANCE )
)
COMPANY,
)

and

Case No.: CR-2012-12437-C
Bond No.: DN25-2767140
Bond Amount: $25,000.00

MOTION TO SET ASIDE
FORFEITURE AND
EXONERATE BOND AND
CONDITIONAL REQUEST
FOR

Surety/Real-Party in Interest. )
~~~~~~~~~-)
Two Jinn, Inc., by and through its counsel ofrecord, Robyn Fyffe, hereby moves this
Court, pursuant to I.C. §19-2922(5) to set aside the September 25, 2012 forfeiture and exonerate
this bond in the above-referenced case. This Motion is based upon the fact

the Defendant

appeared in Court on February 21, 2013 and March 1, 2013 to be arraigned, which dates are prior
to the 180th day after the forfeiture of the above-mentioned bond. See Court ROA.

1 •

MOTION TO SET ASIDE FORFEITURE AND EXONERATE BOND AND
CONDITIONAL REQUEST FOR HEARING

The Court shall exonerate

when a defendant appears

court

days of the forfeiture. LC.§ 19-2922(5). On February 21, 2013 and March , 2013, the
Defendant appeared before the Court and was arraigned. The 180th day after the court forfeited
this bond will be March 24, 2013 and the Court should therefore exonerate

bond based on the

Defendant's February 21, 2013 and March 1, 2013 appearances.
Although the Court can condition the exoneration of the bond pursuant to I. C. § 192922(5) on the bail agent's payment of transportation costs, it appears that neither the
prosecuting attorney nor state or local law enforcement are requesting reimbursement for any
transportation costs in this case. Idaho Criminal Rule 46(k)(l) provides that transportation "costs
shall be determined by the court following filing within fourteen (14) days of the defendants
return, by either the prosecuting attorney or a representative of the state or local law enforcement
entity, of documentation of the costs actually incurred." The fourteenth day after the Defendant
first appeared in Court was March 7, 2013 and no request for costs pursuant to I.C.R. 46(k)(1)
has been filed. See Court ROA. Aladdin thus assumes no transportation costs are being
requested.
Accordingly, the Court should set aside the September 25, 2012 forfeiture and exonerate
this bond. Should the Court, for any reason, determine that this Motion should be denied, it is
respectfully requested that the Court set this matter for a hearing at a mutually convenient date
and time. See attached unavailable dates for Robyn Fyffe through June, 2013.

2 •

MOTION TO SET ASIDE FORFEITURE AND EXONERATE BOND AND
CONDITIONAL REQUEST FOR HEARING

DATED this

/2 day of March, 2013.
~JN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

/'Robyn Fyffe

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

\~y

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
of March, 2013, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:
Canyon County Prosecutor
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

[__] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[__] Hand Delivery
ffiJ Court House Basket
[__] Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
[__] Overnight Mail
[__] Facsimile: 208-454-7474

Canyon County Public Defender
510 Arthur Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

[__] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[__] Hand Delivery
Court House Basket
[__] Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
[__] Overnight Mail
[__] Facsimile: 208-639-4611

UJ

~
~tl~~~~hl-02
~-

\

I,

,,

Heather Price
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MOTION TO SET ASIDE FORFEITURE AND EXONERATE BOND AND
CONDITIONAL REQUEST FOR HEARING
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Case Number Result
Canyon
1 Cases Found.

I

State of Idaho vs. Matthew O Brooks
Next hearing scheduled: 04/23/2013 8:30 AM
D"st . t J d . Thomas J
Amount$O 00
I
r1c u ge. Ryan
due:
•

!

CR-2012'Case: 0012437-C

Charges: Violation Date Charge

I
II

Pending

Citation Degree Disposition
Felony

05/12/2012 I37-2732(C)(l)
Controlled SubstancePossession of
Officer: CC Sheriff's
Office11 CCSO

I hearings:

Date/Time

Pending

Judge

04/23/2013
'
James C. Morf1tt
8 : 30 AM

Hearing Type
Jury Trial

Register

i of
Iactions:

I
1

t
I!,!:

.

I

Date
05/14/2012 New Case Filed-Felony
05/14/2012 Affidavit Of Probable Cause
05/14/2012 Criminal Complaint
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment (In Custody) 05/14/2012 01:32
0511412012
PM)
Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on
0511412012 05/14/2012 01:32 PM: Hearing Held
0511412012

Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on
05/14/2012 01:32 PM: Arraignment I First Appearance

0511412012

Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on
05/14/2012 01:32 PM: Constitutional Rights Warning

Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on
05/14/2012 01:32 PM: Order Appointing Public Defender
Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on
0511412012
05/14/2012 01:32 PM: Consolidation Of Files w/CR2012-12215*C
Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on
0511412012
05/14/2012 01:32 PM: Commitment On Bond/$25 1 000.00
05/14/2012 Change Assigned Judge

0511412012

05/14/2012 Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Hearing 05/24/2012 08:30 AM)
05/15/2012 Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 25000.00)
05/15/2012 Notice of Bond Posted
05/15/2012 PA's Response For Request For Discovery
05/15/2012 Request For Discovery
05/15/2012 Demand For Notice Of Defense Of Alibi
05/16/2012 Waiver Of Extradition
Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing scheduled on 05/24/2012
08:30 AM: Hearing Held
Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing scheduled on 05/24/2012
0512412012
08:30 AM: Preliminary Hearing Waived (bound Over)
Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing scheduled on 05/24/2012
0512412012
08:30 AM: Order Binding Defendant Over to District Court
0512412012

Id<itho Repository - Case Numb

sult Page

05/24/2012 Hearing Scheduled (Arrn. - District Court 06/01/2012 09:00 AM)
05/24/2012 Information
District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Laura
Number of
0610112012
Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages
Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 06/01/2012
06/01/2012 09:03 AM: Hearing Held RYAN-PT-AUG 27@1:30-RYAN-JT-SEPT 2527@9:00-MORFITT
Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 06/01/2012
06/01/2012 09:03 AM: Arraignment I First Appearance RYAN-PT-AUG 27@1:30RYAN-JT-SEPT 25-27@9:00-MORFITT
Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 06/01/2012
06/01/2012 09:03 AM: Appear & Plead Not Guilty RYAN-PT-AUG 27@1:30-RYANJT-SEPT 25-27@9:00-MORFITT
06/01/2012 Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 08/27/2012 01:30 PM)
06/01/2012 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/25/2012 09:00 AM)
06/01/2012 Notice Of Hearing
06/05/2012 Request For Discovery
06/29/2012 Motion to Suppress
06/29/2012 Memorandum of Law In Support of Motion To Suppress
06/29/2012 Notice Of Hearing
0612912012

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 07/23/2012 02:00 PM) Motion to
Suppress

0712312012

Hearing r.esult for ~otion Hearing scheduled on 07/23/2012 02:00
PM: Continued Motion to Suppress
•

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 07/23/2012 02:00
07/23/2012 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
0712312012

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 08/16/2012 01:30 PM) to
suppress

08/02/2012 Pa's First Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery
08/09/2012 Pa's Second Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery
08/14/2012 Objection To Motion To Suppress Evidence
08/15/2012 papers/Notice and Demand For Abatement
0811612012

Hear!ng result for Pre Trial scheduled on 08/27/2012 01:30 PM:
Hearing Vacated

0811612012

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/16/2012 01:30
PM: Hearing Held to suppress - 14 days for additional briefing

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/16/2012 01:30
08/16/2012 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
08/16/2012 Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 09/18/2012 01 :30 PM)
08/24/2012 Pa's Third Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery
08/29/2012 Defendant's Supplemental Brief In Support Of Motion To Suppress
08/30/2012 Motion To Appear Telephonically At Pre-Trial Conference
08/31/2012 Order allowing def to appear telephonically at PT conference
0813112012

Hear!ng result for Pre Trial scheduled on 09/18/2012 01:30 PM:
Hearing Vacated

Hearing ~cheduled (Pre Trial 09/18/2012 03:00 PM) Def to appear
Telephonically
09/04/2012 Objection to motion to suppress evidence
0813112012

09/10/2012 Order to Provide Auto Recording without Cost
09/17/2012 Response to State's Objection to Motion to Suppress

Page 2 of 4

sult Page

Id9-ho Repository - Case Numb

0911812012

Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 09/18/2012 03:00 PM:
Hearing Held Def to appear Telephonically

Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 09/18/2012 03:00 PM:
09/18/2012 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Kim Saunders Number of
Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
09/19/2012 Memorandum decision upon motion to suppress
09/21/2012 Pa's Fourth Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery
09/21/2012 Motion To Shorten Time For Hearing And Notice Of Hearing
09/21/2012 Motion To Continue JT And Notice Of Hearing
0912112012

Hearing ~chedule~ (Motion ~earing 09/24/2012 09:00 AM) motion to
shorten time, motion to continue

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 09/24/2012 09:00
AM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Carole Bull Number
0912412012
of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages
motion to shorten time, motion to continue

0912412012

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 09/24/2012 09:00
AM: Hearing Held motion to shorten time, motion to continue

0912412012

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 09/24/2012 09:00
AM: Continued motion to shorten time, motion to continue

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 09/25/2012 09:00 AM:
District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Debora Kreidler Number
0912512012
of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages
State's Mo to Shorten Time I to Continue
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 09/25/2012 09:00 AM:
09/25/2012 Failure To Appear For Hearing Or Trial State's Mo to Shorten Time/
to Continue
09/25/2012 Notice of Bond Forfeiture
0912512012

Warrant Issued - Bench Bond amount: 50000.00 Failure to Appeartotal bond with CR-2012-12215*C Defendant: Brooks, Matthew 0

09/25/2012 Case Status Changed: Inactive
09/27 /2012 Motion to reconside order denying motion to suppress
09/27/2012 Motion for permission to appeal
09/27/2012 Case Status Changed: Reopened
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 10/10/2012 10:30 AM) Motn for
0912712012
Permission to Appeal/ Motn to Reconsider
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 10/10/2012 10:30
lO/l0/
AM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter:Kim Saunders
2012
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages
lO/l0/

2012

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 10/10/2012 10:30
AM: Hearing Held Motn for Permission to Appeal/ Motn to Reconsider

10/10/2012 Motion Held - Motn to Reconsider
lO/l0/
lO/l0/

2012
2012

m~tion

to reconsider taken under advisement-court to issue written

ruling
Objection to Motion for ~econsideration of Order Denying Motion to
Supress & Leave for Motion to Appeal

10/16/2012 Order Denying Motion to Reconsider
11/19/2012 Order Denying Motion For Permission to Appeal
0211112013

Warrant Returned Failure to Appear-total bond with CR-201212215*C Defendant: Brooks, Matthew 0/ served in Hillsboro Oregon

02/11/2013 Inactive
02/11/2013 Case Status Changed: Inactive
02/21/2013 status changed to Active

3 of
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sult Page
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02/21/2013 Case Status Changed: Pending
0212112013
0212112013

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment (In Custody) 02/21/2013 01:30
PM)
~~)ring Scheduled (Arraignment (In Custody) 02/21/2013 01:30

Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on
02/21/2013 01:30 PM: Hearing Held
Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on
0212112013
02/21/2013 01:30 PM: Arraignment I First Appearance
Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on
0212112013
02/21/2013 01:30 PM: Order Appointing Public Defender
02/21/2013 Hearing Scheduled (Arrn. - District Court 03/01/2013 09:00 AM)
0212112013

Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 03/01/2013
03/01/2013 09:07 AM: Hearing Held RYAN-FTA-JURY TRIALJT-MARCH
508@8:30-MORFITT JT-APRIL 23-26@8:30-MORFITT

I

03/01/2013 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/23/2013 08:30 AM)
District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Laura Whiting Number of
0310112013
Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
03/01/2013 Notice Of Hearing
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IN

DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUCICIAL DISTRICT OF
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PRESIDING: RENAE J. HOFF DATE: MARCH 15, 2013

)

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff,

vs
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS,
Defendant.

COURT MINUTES
CASE NO. CR-2012-12437*C
CR-2012-12215*C

)
)
)

TIME 1:30 P.M.

)
)

REPORTED BY: Kathy Klemetson

)
)

DCRT 5 (201-214)

This having been the time heretofore set for Change of Plea Hearing in the
above entitled matters, the State was represented by Mr. Gearld Wolff, Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County, Idaho, and the defendant was present in
court, represented by counsel, Mr. Lary Sisson.
The Court called the case, reviewed the pending charges and inquired.
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Sisson advised that the cases were

CR-2012-1

consolidated

CR-2012-12215*C \Nould

be dismissed and the

Possession of a Controlled Substance

misdemeanor offenses

in

defendant would be released to pretrial release services pending sentencing.

Further, Mr. Sisson advised that as long as the defendant
offenses, the State would recommend probation.

COURT MINUTES
MARCH 15, 2013

no prior felony

Mr. Sisson reviewed

previous Motion to Suppress that had been denied,
in this case would be conditional and the defendant would

plea

appealing

Motion to Suppress.
Mr. Wolff concurred.
The defendant concurred and was sworn in by the clerk.
Mr. Sisson submitted a Guilty Plea Advisory Form.
The Court examined the defendant, determined the defendant read and
understood the English language, had attended school through the eighth grade and
was twenty-seven (27) years of age. Further, the Court determined that this was the
defendant's first felony offense, determined the defendant recalled the maximum
possible penalty and determined the defendant had not consumed any medication
within the past twenty-four (24) hours. The Court determined the defendant had no
mental conditions, determined the defendant had never attended substance abuse
treatment and determined the defendant was not under the influence of any intoxicating
substances.
The Court reviewed the previous Motion to Suppress, noted that the defendant
would be appealing the decision on the Motion to Suppress and advised that if the
defendant's appeal was granted, he could come back and re-address this case. The
Court further advised that the defendant was pleading guilty to a felony offense,
determined the defendant had decided to plead guilty two (2) weeks previously and
noted that the Court had previously denied the Motion for Permissive Appeal.

COURT MINUTES
MARCH 15, 2013

2

The Court reviewed the charge of Possession of a Controlled Substance,
determined that laboratoiy testing had been completed on the substance and advised
the defendant that he could be ordered to pay restitution for said testing.
Mr. Sisson advised that he had explained the defendant

he would be

ordered to pay restitution, advised that the defendant was well aware of the facts in this
case and advised that there was a factual basis for a plea of guilty. Further, Mr. Sisson
advised that the defendant made incriminating statements at the time of the arrest.
The Court advised the defendant that if he was not a citizen of the United States
and pied guilty, or was found guilty of any criminal offense, it could have immigration
I

consequences to include, deportation from the United States, inability to obtain legal
status in the United States, or denial of an application for United States citizenship.
The Court advised the defendant that by entering a plea of guilty in this case, he
would be waiving his right to remain silent, he would be waiving his right to subpoena
witnesses on his own behalf, examined the defendant and determined there had been
no promises or threats and advised the defendant that by entering a plea of guilty, he
would be waiving his right to remain silent.
The Court examined the defendant and determined that he had not been
diagnosed with a mental illness.
The Court examined the defendant and in answer to the Court's inquiiy,

defendant entered a plea of guilty to the felony offense of Possession of a
Controlled Substance.

COURT MINUTES
MARCH 15, 2013

3

The Court examined the defendant and in answer to the Court's inquiry, the
defendant advised of his Oregon address.
The Court inquired if the defendant could be supervised by pretrial release when
he resided in another state.
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Wolff advised that pretrial release could
supervise the defendant in Oregon.
The Court advised the defendant that he would need to arrange transportation to
complete his Presentence Investigation Report, advised the defendant of the
importance of the Presentence Investigation Report and inquired.
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Wolff advised that the office fer pretrial
release was open until 5:00 p.m. on this date.
The Court advised that the offices for District Ill Probation and Parole was dosed
until the following Monday.
Mr. Sisson advised the Court that the defendant had children residing in the area
and advised that he could stay with them.
A woman in the audience advised that the defendant would not be permitted to
live at the house with their children.
The Court expressed opinions.
Mr. Sisson made responding statements.
The Court advised the defendant that he would be ordered released to pretrial
release services at 8:00 a.m. on Monday, March 18, 2013 and ordered the defendant to
immediately report to Pretrial Release Services and District Ill Probation and Parole to
COURT MINUTES
MARCH 15, 2013
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schedule his appointment for the Presentence Investigation Report.

Court

a Presentence Investigation Report be prepared in this matter and set this matter for
Sentencing on May 6, 2013

2:15 p.m. before Judge Ryan.

Mr. Sisson requested the Court order a 19-2524 Substance Abuse Assessment
as well.
The Court ordered a 19-2524 Substance Abuse Assessment to be completed
as well.
The defendant was remanded to the custody of the Canyon County Sheriff, to be
released to pretrial release services on March 18, 2013 at 8:00 a.m.

,ulLf!/)itvte{
Deputy Clerk

COURT MINUTES
MARCH 15, 2013
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GUILTY PLEA ADVISORY

Defendant's Name:

MATTHEW BROOKS

Date:

Case No.

CR-2012-12437-C

Nature of Charge(s):

Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty:

Possession of a Controlled
Substance (Methamphetamine)

imprisoned for not more than 7 years, or
fined not more than $15,000, or both; 100
hours of community service.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS

& EXPLANATION OF WAIVERS BY PLEA OF GUILTY

(PLEASE INITIAL EACH RESPONSE)
i

1. You have the right to remain silent. You do not have to say anything about
the crime(s) you are accused of committing. If you elected to have a trial, the
state could not call you as a witness or ask you any questions. However,
anything you do say can be used as evidence against you in court.
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to remain silent
before and during trial. _N,_,1'.~\)~-2. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of guilty to
the crime(s) in this case. Even after pleading guilty, you will still have the
right to refuse to answer any question or to provide any information that might
tend to show you committed some other crime(s). You can also refuse to
answer or provide any information that might tend to increase the punishment
for the crime(s) to which you are pleading guilty.
I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still have the
right to remain silent with respect to any other crime(s) and with respect to
answering questions or providing information that may increase my
sentence. f'\i)
.
3. You have the right to be represented by an attorney. If you want an attorney
and cannot pay for one, you can ask the judge for an attorney who will be
paid by the county. -~---D,_____

You are presumed to be innocent. You would be found guilty if: )
a ju
guilty in front of the judge, or 2) you are found guilty

I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to be presumed
innocent. ~
5. You have the right to a speedy and public jury trial. A jury trial is a court
hearing to determine whether you are guilty or not guilty of the charge(s)
brought against you. In a jury trial, you have the right to present evidence in
your defense and to testify in your own defense. The state must convince
each and every one of the jurors of your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to a speedy
public jury trial. M\~
.

6. You have the right to confront the witnesses against you. This occurs during
a jury trial where the state must prove its case by calling witnesses to testify
under oath in front of you, the jury, and your attorney. Your attorney could
then cross-examine (question) each witness. You could also call your own
witnesses of your choosing to testify concerning your guilt or innocence. If
you do not have the funds to bring those witnesses to court, ,the state will pay
·
the cost of bringing your witnesses to court.

I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to confront the
witnesses against me, an present witnesses and evidence in my defense.

~\S,

.

REGARDING PLEA

(Please answer every question. If you do not understand a question consult
your attorney before answering.)
PLEASE CIRCLE ONE

1. Do you read and write the English language?
If not, have you been provided with an interpreter to help
you fill out this form?

2. What is your age?

YES

Q_1

3. What is your true and legal name?

fVloJ-th.c.v

oL/V:e.f' bSJM;-ol{Q.

4. What was the highest grade you completed?
If you did not complete high school, have you received

2

a general education diploma or high school
equivalency diploma?
Are you currently under the care of a mental health
professional?

YES

Have you ever been diagnosed with a mental health
disorder?

YES

If so, what was the diagnosis and when was it made? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

7. Are you currently prescribed any medication?
If so, have you taken your prescription medication
during the past 24 hours?
8. In the last 24 hours, have you taken any medications or
drugs, or drank any alcoholic beverages which you
believe affect your ability to make a reasoned and
informed decision in this case?

YES
YES

YES

9. Is there any other reason that you would be unable to
make a reasoned and informed decision in this case?
1O. ls your guilty plea the result of a plea agreement?
If so, what are the terms of that plea agreement?
(If available, a written plea agreement should be
attached hereto as "Addendum 'A"')
If Defendant pleads guilty to felony Possession of a Controlled Substance, then the
State agrees to dismiss all other charges, release defendant to pre-trial release
services and recommend

Defendant is also allowed to enter a con-

ditiona! guilty plea so he can appeal the denial of his Motion to Suppress.
11. There are two types of plea agreements. Please initial
the one paragraph below which describes the type of
plea you are entering:
a. I understand that my plea agreement is a binding plea agreement.
This means that if the district court does not impose the specific
sentence as recommended by both parties, I will be allowed to
withdraw my plea of guilty and proceed to a jury trial. _ _ __

3

I understand that
plea agreement is a non-binding plea
agreement. This means that the court is not bound
the
agreement or any sentencing recommendations, and may impose
any sentence authorized
law, including the maximum sentence
stated above. Because the court is not bound by the agreement, if
the district court chooses not to follow the agreement, I
not
have the right to withdraw my guilty plea.

!V\\S .

12.As a term of your plea agreement, are you pleading
guilty to more than one crime?

YES

If so, do you understand that your sentences for each
crime could be ordered to be served either concurrently
(at the same time) or consecutively (one after the
other)?

YES

13. ls this a conditional guilty plea in which you are
reserving your right to appeal any pre-trial issues?

NO

e>
~']

If so, what issue are you reserving the right to appeal?

·ik

Ct1tu~

s dOVI rq_Q

ol DerbJalj,Js

bl1ohllfi

4

14. Have you waived your right to appeal your judgment of
conviction and sentence as part of your plea
agreement?

YES

15. Have any other promises been made to you which have
influenced your decision to plead guilty?

YES

S4n{fe5S

<

If so, what are those promises?

16. Do you feel you have had sufficient time to discuss your
case with your attorney?

NO

17. Have you told your attorney everything you know about
the crime?

NO

18. ls there anything you have requested your attorney to
do that has not been done?

~

YES

/.:1

~

4

If yes, please e x p l a i n . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

19. Your attorney can get various items from the prosecutor
relating to your case. This may include police reports,
witness statements, tape recordings, photographs,
reports of scientific testing, etc. This is called discovery.
Have you reviewed the evidence provided to your
attorney during discovery?

YES

20. Have you told your attorney about any witnesses who
would show your innocence?
21. Do you understand that by pleading guilty you will waive
any defenses, both factual and legal, that you believe
you may have in this case?

NO

22. Are there any motions or other requests for relief that
you believe should still be filed in this case?
If so, what motions or requests? __________________

23. Do you understand that if you enter an unconditional
guilty plea in this case you will not be able to challenge
any rulings that came before the guilty plea including: 1)
any searches or seizures that occurred in your case, 2)
any issues concerning the method or manner of your
arrest, and 3) any issues about any statements you may
have made to law enforcement?

YES

NO

24. Do you understand that when you plead guilty, you are
admitting the truth of each and every allegation
contained in the charge(s) to which you plead guilty?

YES

NO

25. Are you currently on probation or parole?

YES

®

YES

NO

If so, do you understand that a plea of guilty in this case
could be the basis of a violation of that probation or
parole?
26. Are you aware that if you are not a citizen of the United

5

States, the entry of a plea or making of factual
admissions could have consequences of deportation or
removal, inability to obtain legal status in the United
States, or denial of an application for United States
citizenship?
27.Do you know whether the crime to which you will plead
guilty would require you to register as a sex offender?
(l.C. § 18-8304)

~

NO

~

28.Are you aware that if you plead guilty you may be
required to pay restitution to the victims in this case?
(l.C. § i 9-5304)

(ffi)

29. Have you agreed to pay restitution to any other party as
a condition of your plea agreement?

YES

If so, to whom? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

NO

8

30. ls there a mandatory driver's license suspension as a
result of a guilty plea in this case?

YES

If so, for how long must your license be suspended? _ _
31.Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which a mandatory
domestic violence, substance abuse, or psychosexual
evaluation is required? (l.C. §§ 18-918(7)(a),-8005(9),8317)

YES

32.Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you may be
required to pay the costs of prosecution and
investigation? (l.C. § 37-2732A(K))

YES

33.Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you will be
required to submit a DNA sample to the state? (l.C. §
19-5506)

YES

34. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which the court
could impose a fine for a crime of violence of up to
$5,000, payable to the victim of the crime? (1.C. § 195307)

YES

35. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony,
during the period of your sentence, you will lose your ~
right to vote in Idaho? (lo. CONST. art. 6, § 3)
(_/

e
NO

36. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony,
6

during the period of your sentence, you will lose your
CONST. art. 6, §3)
right to hold public office in Idaho?
Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony,
during the period of your sentence, you will lose your
right to perform jury service in Idaho? (lo. CONST. art. 6,
§ 3)

38. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony
you will lose your right to purchase, possess, or carry
firearms? (1.C. § 18-310)
39. Do you understand that no one, including your attorney,
can force you to plead guilty in this case?

40. Are you entering your plea freely and voluntarily?

@
@

(~
s

NO
NO
NO

41.Are you pleading guilty because you did commit the acts
alleged in the information or indictment?

YES

€)

42. If you were provided with an interpreter to help you fill
out this form, have you had any trouble understanding
your interprete r?

YES

NO

43. Have you had any trouble answering any of the
questions in this form which you could not resolve by
discussing the issue with your attorney?

YES

1

have answered the questions on pages 1-7 of this Guilty Plea Advisory form
truthfully, understand all of the questions and answers herein, have discussed each
question and answer with my attorney, and have completed this form freely and
voluntarily. Furthermore, no one has threatened me to do so.
Dated this

(

-5

day of

f!I f\orCl!\. , 2o_LJ.,

!ffa/&e-V~
DEFENDANT

I hereby acknowledge that I have discussed, in detail, the foregoing questions and
a swers~ ith my client.
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF CANYON

, DEPUTY
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

c_;lA tl tfJ tt u)
Defendant,

ORDER FOR
H..2onditional Release/Pretrial Services

/ 0 Release on Own Recognizance
0

Commitment on Bond

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the defendant abide by the following conditions of release:

_l//

.

LA!.'.Jdefendant 1s Ordered released

/

0

0

On own recognizance

0

Placed on probation

D

Bond having been set in the sum of$ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

D

Bond having been

D

Upon posting bond, defendant must report to the Canyon County Pretrial Services office as stated below:

0

increased

0

0

Case Dismissed

Total Bond

reduced to the sum of$ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

0

Total Bond

/1

!£[,Defendant shall report to the Canyon County Pretrial Services Office and follow the standard reporting conditions:
Comply with a curfew designated by the Court or standard curfew set by Pretrial Services

/

.

D

Not consume or possess alcoholic beverages or mood altering substances without a valid prescription.

D

Submit to evidentiary testing for alcohol and/or drugs as requested by Pretrial Services at defendant's expense.

D

Not operate or be in the driver's position of any motor vehicle.

D

Abide by any No Contact Order and its conditions.

D

Submit to 0 GPS 0 Alcohol monitoring as directed by Pretrial Services.
Defendants Ordered to submit to GPS or alcohol monitoring shall make arrangements with a provider
approved by Pretrial Services, prior to release.

OTHER:

~.f
'"'~\\ 1'..J' j) Ir 1( l' lc.l
LC'.
fi

i

t·

r ,

.

·""'
!, ·7
I) t;l(

3/is /13

1.I

Failure by defendant to comply with the rulesanctler reporting conditions and/or ~equirements of release as
Ordered by the Court may result in the revoc~~ion ;r~elease and return to the custody of the Sheriff.

Signed:

CJX/~¥//\
. ·--

,-

\ )/

, , I

'!.··~-~·/

/

~hite - Court
'

/

~ow -

1

~\j/V ! '

Jail/Pretrial Services

l,/

,.~ -

Judge

Defendant
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JN
DISTRICT COURT OF THE THlRD JUDICIAL
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN Al~D FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,

)

rUutWil/
~vDOllO
Def~chfut.
11

)

)

CASE NO.
ORDER TO REPORT TO
DISTRICT
PROBATION &PAROLE

)

YOU ARE HEREBY ORDERED TO report to the Department of CmTections District III
Probation & Parole division to set an appointment for your pre-sentence interview and for the
setting of interviews in connection with court ordered substance abuse or mental health evaluations.
WITHIN 48 HOURS, excluding weekends, you must report, in person, to their office
located at 3110 Cleveland Blvd.; Bldg. D; Caldwell, Idaho; Phone (208)

IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO LEAVE A MESSAGE. YOU
APPEAR AT THEIR OFFICE AND :MAKE AN APPOINTMENT
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATOR. FAILURE TO DO SO WILL
WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST.
Dated this

n

day of

61tullt&J

'20

~"')

A

I3.

'Pi!ltl
I hereby ce1tify that I caused the foregoing to be hand delivered to the defendant and served
upon the following via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, facsimile transmission or by placing in their out
box located in the Canyon County Clerk's office:

V/CANYON CO. PROSECUTING ATTORt'\1EY
(
1115 Albany S
aldwell, Idaho 83605

~NYON/,

DISTRICT III PROBATION & PAROLE
3110 Cleveland Blvd., Caldwell, Id 83605

DEFENDER 510 Arthur Street, Caldwell, Idaho 83605

. .,,,..v.,.~ ame & Address

( ~d1lJ?tul_u/clK /
Date

~o:

/':::urt

'--iSeputy Clerk

6~u~?o,e Cou°'ei

ORDE£oREP~~~?

___ ,
DISTRICT III PRDBATION &

4

12/13/2012

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF CANYON
CONTINUED HEARING
STATE OF IDAHO

Case No. CR2012·12437-C
CR2012-12215-C
Plaintiff
Date: May 6. 2013 I 2:15 p.m.

-vsMATTHEW 0. BROOKS,
Defendant.

Judge: Thomas J. Rvan
Reported By: Kim Saunders

D True Name
Corrected Name:

Reccrding: DCRT4 (233-234)
Hearing: sentencing

APPEARANCES:
[gjDefendant's Attorney - Lary Sisson

D Defendant
[gj Prosecutor - Matt Bever

D Interpreter D Other-

PROCEEDINGS: This matter shall be
[gj continued to the

ih day of May, 2013 1 :30 p.m. before Judge Ryan.

D per stipulation of counsel

[gj at the request of D State [gj Defendant/Counsel

[8J to allow defendant to appear, had transportation issues.
BAIL:

The Defendant was

D released on own recognizance (O.R.).
D remanded to custody of the sheriff.
DBailset$_ _

D
D

released to pre-trial release officer.
released on bond previously posted.

OTHER: _ _

-~f1~·----=b=___,,,~,-~~.___

CONTINUED HEARING

,Deputy Clerk

08/2009

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PRESIDING: THOMAS J. RYAN
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

vs.

)

)
)

DATE: MAY 7,

3

COURT MINUTE

)

CASE NO: CR2012-12437-C
CR2012-12215-C

)
)

TIME: 1:30 P.M.

)

MATTHEW 0. BROOKS,

)

DCRT4 (131-144)

)

Defendant.

)

REPORTED BY: Kim Saunders

This having been the time heretofore set for sentencing in the above-entitled
matter, the State was represented by Mr. Matt Bever, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for
Canyon County, Idaho; and the defendant was present and represented by Mr. Lary
Sisson.
The Court called the case and determined all parties had received I reviewed the
Presentence Investigation Report and the GAIN-I assessment.

Factual corrections

were made to the Presentence Investigation Report.
Mr. Bever moved to dismiss the companion misdemeanor charge, recommended
probation and presented argument.

He requested an underlying sentence

one (1)

year fixed followed by three (3) indeterminate and submitted on the issue of a withheld
judgment. Mr. Bever requested restitution in the amount of $100.00 for lab testing and
submitted to the Court on any other terms and conditions of the sentence.
COURT MINUTE
MAY 6, 2013

1

Mr. Sisson made statements about the defendant and presented argument in
support of the Court granting the defendant a withheld judgment. He recommended a
three (3) year period of probation, one hundred (100) hours of community seNice
pursuant to statute and Level I treatment. Mr. Sisson believed the defendant had credit
for forty-two (42) days seNed and requested no additional jail to seNe, just
discretionary jail granted to the probation officer.
The defendant made no statements to the Court on his own behalf.
The Court examined the defendant as to his residence and indicated it had no
objection to an interstate compact with Oregon.
The Court granted the withheld judgment and placed the defendant on
probation for three (3) years under the standard terms and conditions of
probation, which where explained to him, and the following additional conditions:
The defendant was ordered to pay court costs, reimburse the County for the
Public Defender in the amount of $350.00, and pay the monthly

of supervision.

The defendant was ordered to enroll in and successfully complete Level I
treatment as recommended in the substance abuse evaluation.

The defendant

was not to purchase, possess, or consume any alcohol or enter into any business
where alcohol was the primary source of revenue. The defendant was ordered to
serve one hundred eighty (180) days in the county jail at the discretion of
probation officer.

The defendant was ordered to complete one hundred (100)

hours of community service.
COURT MINUTE
MAY6,2013

2

In answer to Mr. Bever's inquiry and there being no
defense, the Court ordered the defendant to pay

the
pursuant to the

restitution order.

The Court provided the defendant a notice of his rights upon sentencing, which
the defendant reviewed, signed, and returned to the Court.
Both of counsel returned their copy of the Presentence Investigation Report to
the Court.
The defendant was released to probation.

COURT MINUTE
MAY 6, 2013

arr

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

THE STATE OF IDAHO
CASE NO. CR2012-12437
Plaintiff,
RESTITUTION ORDER
vs.
MATTHEW 0 BROOKS,
Defendant.

Based upon the judgment and sentence in this case, and the expenses of the victim on this
matter, and pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 37-2732.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT THE DEFENDANT, MATTHEW 0 BROOKS, pay
ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS AND NO CENTS ($100.00) in restitution

that such

restitution be paid to the Court to be distributed by the Court to the following victim(s):
Idaho State Police
Forensic Services
700 S. Stratford Dr., Suite #125
Meridian, ID 83642-6202
Date
7/20/2012

RESTITUTION ORDER

Lab Expense
$100.00

Total
$100.00

Such restitution shall be joint and several with any other co-defendants who are ordered
to

restitution arising from the same occurrence or event.
There are no known co-defendants.
In cases where there are direct and indirect victims, restitution payments will be

distributed to direct victims before indirect victims.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to LC. Section 19-5305, that forty-two (42)

days after entry of this order, or at the conclusion of a hearing to reconsider this order, whichever
occurs later, this order may be recorded as judgment and the victim( s) may execute as provided
by law for civil judgments.

DATED this

1.(A-. day of _ _ __.__ _ _ _ _ _ , 2013.
District Judge

RESTITUTION ORDER

2

1

OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
forwarded to the following persons this

was

6,
~

Prosecutor:

Mailed - - - -

Court Basket

Public Defender:

Mailed

Court Basket - - -

Idaho State Police:
Forensic Services
700 S. Stratford Dr., Suite #125
Meridian, ID 83642-6202

Mailed - - - -

Court Basket - - - -

~

Court Basket - - - -

Felony Parole & Probation:

Dated

s/ ~ in_

CHRIS YAMAMOTO
Clerk of the District Court

By:

RESTITUTION ORDER

07/09/2012
700 South Stratford

CL Case No.:
Agency:
ORI:

Idaho State Police Forensic Services
Ste 125 Meridian ID 83642-6202

M20122082
SP30 - ISP-PATROL
IDISP0300

2

Case No.:

812001578

Crime Date: May 12, 2012

Criminalistic Analysis Report - CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ANALYSIS

A F F I DA V I T
STATE OF IDAHO}
}

SS.

COUNTY OF ADA }
Corinna C. Owsley, being first duly sworn, deposes and says the following:
That I am a Forensic Scientist II with Forensic Services and am
qualified to perform the examination and draw conclusions of the type shown
on the attached reporL;
1.

2.

That Forensic Services is part of the Idaho State Police;
I

That I conducted a scientific examination of evidence described in Lhe
attached report in the ordinary course and scope of my duties with Forensic
Services;
3.

That the conclusion(s) expressed in that report is/are correct LO the
best of my knowledge;
4.

That the case identifying information reflected in that report came
from the evidence packaging, a case report, or another reliable source.

5.

6.

That a true and accurate copy of that report is attached to this

Date:

I

I

SUBSCRIBED
,...•.•1

/
Not;.e.ry Public
co!Tu~ission Expires:

-"~~~,_,__.:....~~~~~~

Idaho State Police
Drug Restitution
As provided in Idaho Code 37-2732(k), the Idaho State Police requests restitution from
the defendant(s), Matthew 0 Brooks in the amount of $100.00 in association with
Laboratory Report No. M20122082. This amount is based upon the confirmation of the
following drug(s) being present in the sample(s) submitted to this laboratory. The
amount requested reflects a portion of the cost incurred to the laboratory during the
analysis of drug evidence.
Confirmed Drug/ Analysis
1) Methamphetamine (1 sample confirmed at 100.00 each)

Cost
100.00

2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

Please present this restitution request form and a copy of the laboratory report to the
court at the time of sentencing.
Please make checks payable to:

Forensic Services
700 South Stratford Drive Ste 125
Meridian, Idaho 83642-6202

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,

~

Natasha Wheatley
Forensic Services
Laboratory Manager

mh
July 9, 2012

0 0 1 59

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)
Plaintiff,

)

)
-vsMATTHEW 0. BROOKS,
SS#
D.O
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER OF PROBATION ON

WITHHELD J
CASE NO. CR2012-12437-C

On this ]1h day of May, 2013, personally appeared Matt Bever, Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County, Idaho and the defendant, Matthe\v 0. Brooks,
and the defendant's attorney, Lary Sisson.
It appearing to the satisfaction of the Court that the ends of justice and the best
interests of the public, as well as of the defendant, will be served thereby, it is Ordered
that the Judgment be withheld on the defendant's plea of guilty to the offense of
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a felony, as charged in the Information, a
violation of Idaho Code Section 37-2732(c)(1), committed on or about the 1ih day of
May, 2012, in compliance with Idaho Code 19-2601, sub section 3, and that the
defendant be placed on probation under the supervision and control of the Idaho State
Department of Correction, Probation and Parole Division and this Court for a period of
three (3) years commencing on the ]1h day of May, 2013, under the following terms and
conditions:
That the defendant shall: (a) violate no State, Federal, or Municipal penal laws;
(b) not change residence without first obtaining written permission from the supervising
officer; (c) submit a truthful written report to the supervising officer each and every
month and report in person when requested; (d) not leave the State or the Judicial
District assigned to supervise the defendant's probation without first obtaining written
permission from the supervising officer; (e) seek and maintain employment or a
ORDER OF PROBATION ON
WITHHELD JUDGMENT
/'},-,Al;.

program approved by the supervising officer, and not change employment or program
without first obtaining written permission from the supervising officer; (f) waive
defendant's constitutional right to be free from search and consent to the search of their
person, residence, vehicle, or property at the request of the supervising officer or any
law enforcement officer; (g) not purchase or possess any firearms or weapons; (h) not
possess any controlled substances without a valid prescription; (i) submit to tests for
controlled substances and/or alcohol at probationer's own expense upon the request of
the supervising officer or any law enforcement officer; (j) follow the advice and
instructions of the supervising officer; (k) execute a waiver of extradition.
SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

1. The defendant shall pay in the oirder listed each of the foilowing sums as
specified:
A. Court costs of $17.50:
B. Victims compensation fund of $75.00;
C. Pay restitution pursuant to the restitution order;
D. An !STARS technology fee of $10.00;
E. A fee of $10.00 for deposit into the peace officers standards and training
account;
F. A fee in the amount of $350.00 to reimburse the County tor the cost of the
Public Defender;
G. An administrative surcharge of $10.00 for deposit into the county justice fund;
H. A fee in the amount of $10.00 for the Drug Violations Hotline;

I.

A fee in the amount of $30.00 for the Substance Abuse/Domestic Violence
fund;

J. A fee in the amount of $3.00 for the Peace and Detention Officer's Temporary
Disability fund;
ORDER OF PROBATION ON
WITHHELD JUDGMENT
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K. An emergency surcharge in the amount of $100.00.
All of the previous stated amounts of money are due and payable to the District
Court at a rate and schedule to be determined by the supervising officer.
1. Pay a monthly probation supervision fee as set by the supervising officer;

OTHER SPECIAL CONDITIONS

1. The defendant shall enroll in and successfully complete all programs of
rehabilitation recommended by his supervising officer including, but not limited to
programs on substance abuse, anger management, vocational rehabilitation,
mental health, and self-esteem counseling;
2. The defendant shall enroll in and successfully complete all treatment as
recommended in the substance abuse evaluation ordered pursuant to l.C. § 192524;
3. The defendant shall not purchase, possess or consume alcohol, nor enter into
any establishment where the sale of alcohol is the primary source of revenue;
4. The defendant shall complete one hundred (100) hours of community service on
a schedule to be determined by his supervising officer.
5. The defendant shall serve one hundred eighty (180) days in the Canyon County
Jail at the discretion of his supervising officer and with the approval of the Court;

The Court had no objection to the defendant's probation being transferred via
interstate compact to Oregon upon the approval of the defendant's supervising officer.

The terms of the defendant's probation may be revoked, modified, or extended at
any time by the Court, and in the event of any violation of the conditions hereof, during
the period of probation, the Court may revoke this Order and impose Judgment.

ORDER OF PROBATION ON
WITHHELD JUDGMEl\JT

Defendant is subject to arrest without a warrant for violation of any condition hereby
imposed.

DATED this tifL.day of May, 2013.

understand, accept and will abide by the terms and conditions of the above
Order.

DATED this _ _ day o f - - - - - - - - - ' 2013.

Defendant

WITNESSED:

ORDER OF PROBATION ON
WITHHELD JUDGMENT
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MARK J. MIMURA
CANYON COUNTY

DEFENDER

LARY G. SISSON
5 Arthur Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 639-4610
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611
Idaho State Bar No. 6072

Attorneys for Defendant

IN

DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CR-2012-12437-C
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

NOTICE OF
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS,
Defendant/Appellant.

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Appellant, MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, appeals against

the above-named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the following:
A.

The Judgment of Conviction and Commitment that was filed in this

matter on or about May 14, 2013.
2.

These matters were heard, and the Judgments were entered, in the Third

Judicial District, in and for the County of Canyon by District Court Judge Thomas J. Ryan.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on

intends to assert

the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal

not

prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal or amending

listed

below.
A.

Whether the Court erred on or about September

2012 by

to grant Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence?
4.

Appellant has the right to appeal all final judgments of convictions m

criminal proceedings pursuant to Rule l l(c)(l) of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
5.

Appellant requests a transcript, in electronic form only, of the following

hearings in this matter:
A.

6.

The Motion to Suppress Hearing held on August 16, 2012.

In addition to the standard clerk's record on appeal, the Appellant requests

the following:
A.

Copies of all briefs, memorandums, objections, and responses to

objections filed in this matter which were related to the Motion to Suppress; and
B.

Copies of all exhibits admitted into evidence during the Motion to

Suppress Hearing that was held on August 16, 2012.
7.

I certify:
A.

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each

Reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out
below:
Kim Saunders
c/o Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605

NOTICE OF APPEAL

B.

That the appellant is exempt from

the estimated

because he is indigent.
C.

That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the

preparation of the clerk's record because he is indigent.
D.

That appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee

because he is indigent.
That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20 and the attorney general ofidaho pursuant to Section 67-1401 (1 ),
Idaho Code.
DATED tl:-iis 24th day of May, 2013.

LARY G. SISSON
Assistant Public Defender

NOTICE OF APPEAL

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on 24th day of May, 2013, I served a true and correct
within and foregoing Notice of Appeal upon the individual(s) named

the manner

noted:
../'

By placing copies of the same in the designated courthouse box of the
below.
Kim Saunders
Court Reporter
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605

Bryan F. Taylor
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605
../'

indicated

By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, first class, to
the addresses of the person(s) indicated below.

Matthew 0. Brooks
1061 NW B~·iar Creek Way,
Beaverton, OR 97006

Lawrence Wasden
Idaho Attorney General
700 W. State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
State Appellate Public Defender
3040 N. Lake Harbor, Ste 100
Boise, ID 83703

LARY G. SISSON
Assistant Public Defender

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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MARK ,J. lVIIMURA
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
G. SISSON
510 Arthur Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 639-4610
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611
Idaho State Bar No. 6072

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

STATE OF

IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CR-2012-12437-C

Plaintiff/Respondent,

MOTION FOR
STATE
DEFENDER

vs.
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS,

OF

Defendant/Appellant.

COMES NOW, MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, by and through the his attorneys of record,
the Canyon County Public Defender's Office, and hereby moves this Comt for

order, pursuant

to Idaho Code § 19-867 et. seq., appointing the State Appellate Public Defender's Office to
represent the Appellant in all further appellate proceedings and allowing current counsel for the
defendant to withdraw as counsel of record for the purpose of appellate proceedings. This
motion is brought on the grounds and for the reasons that:
1.

The Appellant is currently represented by the Canyon County Public Defender;

2.

The State Appellate Public Defender is authorized by statute to represent the

defendant in all felony appellate proceedings;

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

Page 1

3.

It is

the interest of justice for them to do so

indigent and any further proceedings on this case will

this case since
an

DATED this 24th day of May, 2013.

LARY G. SISSON
Assistant Public Defender

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

Page 2

defendant is

I hereby

on

24th day of May, 2013, I

a true

correct

the

above and foregoing Motion for Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender upon the
individual(s) named below in the manner noted:

../

By hand delivering copies of the same to the office(s) of the attorney(s) indicated below.
Bryan F. Taylor
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605

../

Kim Saunders
Court Reporter
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605

By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, first class, or
Lawrence Wasden
Idaho Attorney General
700 W. State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

Matthew 0. Brooks
1061 NW Briar Creek \Vay,
Beaverton, OR 97006

State Appellate Public Defender
3040 N. Lake Harbor, Ste 100
Boise, ID 83703

LARY G. SISSON
Assistant Public Defender

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

Page 3

227
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J. MIMURA
COUNTY

LARY G. SISSON
510 Arthur Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Telephone: (208) 639-4610
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611
Idaho State Bar No. 6072
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE

OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
OF IDAHO,
CASE NO. CR-201

12437-C

Plaintiff/Respondent,

ORDER APPOINTING STATE
APPELLt\TE PUBLIC

vs.
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS,
Defendant/Appellant.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court pursuant to Defendant/Appellant's
Motion for Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender; the Court having reviewed the
pleadings on file and the motion, the Court being fully apprised in the matter and good cause
appearing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Canyon County Public Defender is withdrawn as
counsel of record for the Defendant-Appellant and the State Appellate Public Defender is hereby
appointed to represent the Defendant-Appellant, MATTHE\V 0. BROOKS, in the above entitled
matters for appellate purposes.

ORDER APPOINTING STATE
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

The appointment of the State Appellate Public Defender is for purposes of the appeal

~

~

DATED this-2Q:_ day May, 2013.

THOMAS J. RY Al'l"
District Court Judge

ORDER APPOINTING STATE
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

CERTIFICAT~ERVICE

7\

Ct3yv

of.J>f!Y.'

I hereby certify that on the ~J
2013, I served a true
foregoing upon the individual(s) named beiow in the manner noted:

correct

By delivering copies of the same to the designated courthouse boxes of the
indicated below.

o

Bryan F. Taylor
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605

Canyon County Public Defender
510 Arthur Street
Caldwell, ID 83605

Kim Saunders
Court Reporter
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605

Matthew 0. Brooks
c/o Canyon County Public
510 Arthur Street
Caldwell, ID 83605

the

or

By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, first class, to the
following indicated below.
Lawrence Was den
Idaho Attorney General
700 W. State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

State Appellate Public Defender
3040 N. Lake Harbor, Ste 100
Boise, ID 83703

CHRIS YAMAMOTO
Clerk of the Court

~~

By:~

Deputy Clerk

ORDER APPOINTING STATE
APPELL'\TE PUBLIC DEFENDER

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO,

STATE OF IDAHO,
PlaintiffRespondent,
-vs-

AND FOR THE COUNTY

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-12-12437*C
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

)
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS,
DefendantAppellant.

)
)
)
)

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify the following are
being sent as exhibits:

Presentence Investigation Report

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this __.._.~- day

CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

STATE OF IDAHO, IN ~ND FOR THE COUNTY OF CM"YON

STATE OF IDAHO,
PlaintiffRespondent,
-vsMATTHEW 0. BROOKS,
DefendantAppellant.

)
)
)

Case No. CR-12-12437 *C

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

I, CHRIS Y~l\1AMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing Record in the above entitled case was compiled and bound under my
direction as, and is a true, full correct Record of the pleadings and documents under
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, including all documents lodged or filed as requested
in the Notice of Appeal.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal
of the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ~~- day

CHRIS YAMA.M:OTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Canyon.
Deputy

CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
OF

STATE OF IDAHO,
PlaintiffRespondent,
-vsMATTHEW 0. BROOKS,
DefendantAppellant.

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court

41046-2013

CERTIFICATE OF SER\lICE

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one
of the Clerk's Record and one copy of the Reporter's Transcripts to the
record to each party as follows:
Sara Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender's Office,
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Ste. 100, Boise, Idaho 83703
Lmvrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Statehouse, Boise, Idaho 83720
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal
of the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this----=--- day
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the
J udicia1
District of the State of Idaho
in and for the

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

of

